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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR WORKS IN THE
LANGUAGE OF LIFE
Nina Srejovic*
Abstract: In 2001, the DNA Copyright Institute sought to capitalize on the fear of human
cloning by offering celebrities the opportunity to use copyright to secure exclusive rights in
their DNA. At the time, a Copyright Office spokesperson pointed out that a person’s DNA “is
not an original work of authorship.” That statement is no longer self-evident. A scientist claims
to have used CRISPR technology to create a pair of twin girls with human-altered DNA that
may provide immunity to HIV infection and improved cognitive function. Through gene
therapy, doctors can “author” changes to patients’ DNA to cure disease. Scientists “edit”
bacterial cell DNA to produce medicines and industrial enzymes. Researchers have “written”
original DNA encoding a GIF of a running horse. Does copyright grant exclusive rights to
these creations?
For decades, scholars have argued that DNA sequences, like computer programs, are
copyrightable “works” encompassed by the Copyright Act’s definition of “literary works.” So
far, the Copyright Office is unconvinced and continues to list DNA sequences and compounds
as “works” that do not constitute copyrightable subject matter. This Article takes a new
approach by proposing that DNA is not a “work” at all. Rather, DNA is a medium in which
information is stored. In the words of the Copyright Act, DNA compounds are “copies” in
which an original copyrightable work or a functional creation may be fixed. Under this
framework, literature is entitled to copyright protection whether it exists as a copy printed on
paper or encoded into DNA. Genetic DNA, which functions as a component of cellular
machinery to produce useful chemicals, is entitled to no more copyright protection than any
other machine component. Rejecting this approach and continuing to treat DNA as a “work”
rather than a “copy” has real world consequences. The recent history of copyright protection
for computer programs provides a cautionary tale. Mischaracterizing DNA in the way that
computer programs have been mischaracterized — as a type of “work” under the Copyright
Act — could lead to the extension of exclusive copyrights to the functional DNA in living
organisms in the same way that copyright protection has been extended to some functional
aspects of computer programs.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2018, Dr. He Jiankui claimed to have created the first
babies born with human-edited DNA.1 Although He’s claim has not been
verified, Henry T. Greely’s recent book, CRISPR People, The Science and
Ethics of Editing Humans, provides a fascinating narrative of He’s
experiment.2 He and his team recruited HIV-positive couples and offered
them free fertility treatments, medical care, and a stipend.3 According to
He, he used Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats
(CRISPR) technology to edit the DNA of at least two fertilized eggs to
grant immunity to HIV infection,4 and these eggs resulted in the birth of
a pair of genetically HIV-resistant twin girls.5
He’s experiment raises important ethical and moral questions that have
been addressed by Greely6 and others,7 but this Article discusses another
crucial issue exposed by recent advances in DNA technology—

1. HENRY T. GREELY, CRISPR PEOPLE: THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF EDITING HUMANS 3 (2021).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 15.
4. Antonio Regalado, China’s CRISPR Twins Might Have Had Their Brains Inadvertently
Enhanced, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/
02/21/137309/the-crispr-twins-had-their-brains-altered/ [https://perma.cc/C8BS-39Q9].
5. See GREELY, supra note 1, at 16.
6. Id.; Henry T. Greely, CRISPR’d Babies: Human Germline Genome Editing in the ‘He Jiankui
Affair’, 6 J.L. & BIOSCI. 111 (2019). If the experiment transpired as he described, the ethical issues
are more serious than those present with other DNA technology because the edits that Dr. He says he
made to the babies’ DNA could be passed on to future generations.
7. See LeRoy Walters, Robert M. Cook-Deegan & Eli Y. Adashi, Governing Heritable Human
Genome Editing: A Textual History and a Proposal for the Future, 4 CRISPR J. 469 (2021).
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ownership. If He and his team were successful in altering the DNA of the
fertilized eggs, did they “author” the DNA of the baby girls? If so, as
authors, do copyright laws grant the exclusive right to reproduce or
prepare derivative works from the girls’ DNA? Following the logic of
previous articles on DNA copyright, they would.8
While the CRISPR technology that He claims to have used to edit DNA
was invented in the 2010s,9 for decades scientists have applied other
techniques to construct original DNA compounds not found in nature.
These techniques include splicing naturally occurring DNA compounds
together to create new compounds that enable the cells of organisms to
produce proteins that those cells do not produce in nature, such as human
hormones,10 improved enzymes to confront pollution,11 cheese enzymes,12

8. See, e.g., Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 191, 192 (1982) (“[V]irtually all original works of a genetic scientist are copyrighted
automatically when he creates them.”); Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 1,
26 (2011) (“Works of genetic authorship fit within the existing framework of copyright law.”);
Christopher M. Holman, Charting the Contours of a Copyright Regime Optimized for Engineered
Genetic Code, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 399, 456 (2017) (“[I]t only makes sense to move toward a copyright
regime that accommodates genetic sequences.”); Michael D. Murray, Post-Myriad Genetics
Copyright of Synthetic Biology and Living Media, 10 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (2014) (extending the
metaphor that human-created DNA sequences are computer programs for cells to conclude that “the
entire creation of the biologist may be protected” by copyright); Devdatta Malshe, Copyrighting DNA:
An Off-Label Use, 19 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 42 (2018) (suggesting that
printing the details of human-constructed DNA grants copyright protection to the DNA); Christopher
M. Holman, Claes Gustafsson & Andrew W. Torrance, Are Engineered Genetic Sequences
Copyrightable?: The U.S. Copyright Office Addresses a Matter of First Impression, 35 BIOTECH. L.
REP. 103, 118 (2016) (“[T]he justification for maintaining copyright protection for software while
denying it for human-designed DNA becomes increasingly questionable.”); Donna Smith, Copyright
Protection for the Intellectual Property Rights to Recombinant Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal,
19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1083, 1106 (1988) (arguing that recombinant DNA molecules should be
copyrightable just as machine readable computer programs are).
9. See generally Martin Jinek, Krzysztof Chylinski, Ines Fonfara, Michael Hauer, Jennifer A.
Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, A Programmable Dual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonuclease in
Adaptive Bacteria Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816 (2012).
10. How Did They Make Insulin from Recombinant DNA?, NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.,
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/fromdnatobeer/exhibition-interactive/recombinantDNA/recombinant-dna-technology-alternative.html [https://perma.cc/S735-F6D7].
11. Lynne Peeples, How Rabbit Genes Could Turn Ordinary Houseplants into Pollution-Eating
Machines, NBC NEWS: MACH (Mar. 5, 2019, 10:17 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
mach/science/how-rabbit-genes-could-turn-ordinary-houseplants-pollution-eating-machinesncna979486 [https://perma.cc/3AVH-TQ3V].
12. C.L. Hicks, J. O’Leary & J. Bucy, Use of Recombinant Chymosin in the Manufacture of
Cheddar and Colby Cheese, 71 J. DAIRY SCI. 1127, 1127 (1988).
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and fuels, plastics and detergents.13 Through gene therapy,14 doctors can
introduce beneficial alterations to patients’ DNA.15 The United States
Food and Drug Administration has approved several uses of humanconstructed DNA to treat disease.16 Indeed, researchers produced mRNA
(a close cousin to DNA17) compounds which, when injected into humans,
harness human cells to produce a portion of a nonhuman protein to
vaccinate against Covid-19.18
Scientists are using CRISPR and other DNA synthesis techniques to
construct DNA for a new engineering discipline. The synthetic biology
community is working to create a collection of modular standard
biological parts to aid in assembling engineered biological systems.19
These “parts” are essentially a database of DNA sequences that contain
the information necessary for cells to perform a standard set of biological
operations.20 Scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) started a registry of standard “biological parts” to be used as
components to construct systems or more complex biological parts.21 The
registry is now maintained by the iGEM Foundation, an organization that

13. BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., HEALING, FUELING, FEEDING: HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY IS ENRICHING
YOUR LIFE 32 (2010), https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/legacy/bioorg/docs/ValueofBiotech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MB8M-PWKS].
14. What Is Gene Therapy? How Does It Work?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/what-gene-therapy-how-does-itwork?%20how%20does%20it%20work? [https://perma.cc/GRV8-JRA9].
15. Karen Bulaklak & Charles A. Gersbach, The Once and Future Gene Therapy, 11 NATURE
COMMC’NS. 1 (2020).
16. What Is Gene Therapy? How Does It Work?, supra note 14 (“In gene therapy, scientists can do
one of several things depending on the problem that is present. They can replace a gene that causes a
medical problem with one that doesn’t, add genes to help the body to fight or treat disease, or turn off
genes that are causing problems.”).
17. This Article uses the term DNA to refer to all chemical compounds that consist of a series of
nucleotides, such as DNA, RNA, cDNA, and oligonucleotides. While there are differences between
these compounds that are relevant in the context of biochemistry, they present the same issues with
regard to copyright law. Ribonucleic acid (RNA), like DNA, is a nucleic acid present in all living
cells. Messenger RNA (mRNA) is a type of RNA that carries the information contained in cellular
DNA from the nucleus to the cytoplasm. Messenger RNA (mRNA), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST.
(May 17, 2022), https://www.genome.gov/genetics-glossary/messenger-rna [https://perma.cc/X6ACXPMY].
18. Understanding mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/mrna.html
[https://perma.cc/K9Y9-KRCC].
19. David Singh Grewal, Before Peer Production: Infrastructure Gaps and the Architecture of
Openness in Synthetic Biology, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 143, 160 (2017).
20. Id. at 158; Parts, IGEM REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS,
https://parts.igem.org/Help:Parts [https://perma.cc/8BSW-W4AK].
21. See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1745, 1745 (2007).
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holds competitions for biologically engineered inventions.22 The DNA
sequences in the database may be inserted into the DNA of a cell to cause
it to release a smell,23 synthesize plastics,24 or cause cell death.25
Have scientists authored these DNA compounds that produce proteins
or serve other functional purposes in cells? Does copyright grant the
scientists who create new functional DNA compounds exclusive rights to
reproduce and distribute them? Extension of copyright protection to such
clearly functional DNA compounds may seem unlikely. However, DNA’s
similarity to computer software, the limitations of patent protection for
DNA, and new developments in DNA technology mandate that the
potential for exclusive rights granted by copyright, and their limits, be
carefully considered.
Soon after the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,26 scholars
began speculating about the relationship between copyright and DNA.27
This interest has continued unabated,28 with much legal scholarship
advocating for the extension of copyright protection to DNA.29 Scholars
have concluded, by analogy to copyright in computer programs, copyright
22. See iGEM 2022, IGEM REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, http://parts.igem.org
[https://perma.cc/T9F3-P66R].
23. Odor, IGEM REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, http://parts.igem.org/Odor
[https://perma.cc/T9F3-P66R].
24. Biosynthesis, IGEM REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, http://parts.igem.org/
Biosynthesis [https://perma.cc/8J3W-2TFL].
25. Cell Death, IGEM REGISTRY OF STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, http://parts.igem.org/
Cell_death [https://perma.cc/4QLZ-VTSY].
26. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810.
27. See, e.g., Kayton, supra note 8; Jorge A. Goldstein, Copyrightability of Genetic Works, 2
NATURE BIOTECH. 138 (1984); Smith, supra note 8; Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant
DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469 (1989). Some have also posed the related question of
copyright protection for genetically engineered organisms. See Kayton, supra note 8, at 218;
Goldstein, supra, at 139. For a discussion of copyright for genetically engineered organisms, see
Murray, supra note 8.
28. Dan L. Burk, DNA Copyright in the Administrative State, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1297 (2018);
Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 629, 642–
48 (2010); Holman et al., supra note 8; Holman, supra note 8, at 402.
29. Smith, supra note 8, at 1096, 1106 (suggesting that because recombinant DNA molecules could
be viewed as “machine readable,” they should be copyrightable just as machine readable computer
programs); Kayton, supra note 8, at 201 (arguing that engineered genetic works “are certainly
analogous, if not nearly identical, to computer programs . . . [and b]ecause of this
similarity . . . should be copyrightable”); Holman et al., supra note 8, at 118 (“[T]he justification for
maintaining copyright protection for software while denying it for human-designed DNA becomes
increasingly questionable.”). Dan L. Burk and Iver P. Cooper represent the dissenting opinion. See
Burk, supra note 27, at 532 (advocating for entirely novel legislation or modification of existing
statutes rather than “stuffing biotechnology into the copyright box”); IVER P. COOPER, 2
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW §§ 14:2–:3 (2020) (stating “[c]opyright protection not available for
gene sequences or molecules” and “[a] DNA sequence is not a ‘work of authorship’ within the
meaning of the Copyright Act”).
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should protect “human-designed DNA,”30 “DNA code,”31 “genetically
engineered works,”32 or “recombinant DNA.”33
Few would argue that the model of copyright protection for computer
software is something to emulate. Since registration of the first computer
program in the Copyright Office, both courts and commentators have
shown significant ambivalence concerning copyright protection for
computer programs.34 In the decades since the Commission on New and
Technological Uses35 (CONTU) declared that copyright protects
computer programs but not the electro-mechanical functioning of a
machine, courts have tied themselves in knots in their attempts to
distinguish between the two. No fewer than four different tests have been
devised in the various federal circuits to separate the copyrightable
“expression” of computer programs from their uncopyrightable
function.36 As a result, court decisions regarding the scope of copyright
protection in computer technology are highly unpredictable. In Google
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.,37 the Supreme Court could do no better than
to start its reasoning with the assumption that the program copied was
entitled to copyright protection.38 In addition, courts have upheld
exclusive rights in functional technology under copyright law without

30. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 118.
31. Malshe, supra note 8, at 42.
32. Kayton, supra note 8, at 201.
33. Smith, supra note 8, at 1096.
34. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 344 (1970) (“One should become suspicious of the
need for protection at present upon learning that the software industry is currently burgeoning without
the use of copyright . . . .”); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Corp., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw
puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit.”), aff’d per curiam, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Comput. Assocs. Int’l
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Thus far, many of the decisions in this area reflect
the courts’ attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole.”).
35. For a description of the Commission and its discussions concerning software, see Pamela
Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in
Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984).
36. See Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the
Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1215 (2017) (evaluating
four tests used by courts in determining copyright infringement of computer programs: 1) an approach
treating all structure, sequence, and organization of programs as protectable expression as long as
there are multiple ways to perform a program function; 2) an approach applying an abstractionfiltration-comparison test; 3) an approach focused on whether elements are processes or methods of
operation excluded from copyright protection; and 4) an approach concentrated on determining
whether program ideas or functions have merged with program expression).
37. 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
38. Id. at 1186.
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either the novelty required by the patent system39 or the limited duration
of rights granted by patent.40 Looking to copyright protection in computer
technology for guidance about copyright protection in DNA technology
would likely lead to similar uncertainty as well as exclusive rights in the
functional aspects of cellular machinery.
Recent experience with patent protection for DNA also points to the
importance of carefully considering copyright protection for DNA
technology. Scholars have previously recognized the risks of extending
broad patent rights to human-constructed DNA that operates in cells of
organisms engineered to have new abilities. For example, Sapna Kumar
and Arti Rai have noted that foundational patents and patent thickets41 in
the context of DNA have the potential to stifle innovation to the extent
they cover standards that synthetic biologists seek to establish.42 The goals
of standardization may be thwarted,43 and subsequent research may suffer
from lack of access.44 While, as Kumar and Rai correctly recognize,
intellectual property rights may sometimes be necessary to create a
commons for use by multiple parties,45 if the experience of patent rights
in DNA is any guide, it seems more likely that any exclusive copyrights
granted in DNA will be closely guarded. Recent scholarship has also
predicted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.46—invalidating patent claims for some
DNA compounds—will only intensify the interest in copyright protection
for DNA. Those who have previously relied on patents to gain exclusive

39. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (“[C]opyright protects originality rather than novelty
or invention . . . .”).
40. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
41. Kumar and Rai refer to a proliferation of patents on basic parts and devices as a “transactioncost-heavy thicket[].” See Kumar & Rai, supra note 21, at 1747.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1747–62.
44. Recognizing that in the context of synthetic biology, “the ability to invoke copyright [was] by
no means clear,” Kumar and Rai advocate for a “parallel unpatented space.” Id. at 1764, 1768.
Similarly, discussions of the obstacles to establishing an “open source” database of these DNA
sequences have focused on patent, rather than copyright, protection for DNA. See Grewal, supra note
19, at 143, 178–79; see also Ethan R. Fitzpatrick, Comment, Open Source Synthetic Biology:
Problems and Solutions, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2013). Interestingly, the BioBricks
Foundation, which seeks to use contract law to establish a public domain of DNA sequences to
promote open development in this technology, requires nonassertion of all intellectual property rights.
See The Open Material Transfer Agreement, BIOBRICKS FOUND., https://biobricks.org/open-materialtransfer-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/RJ6N-AEM7].
45. Kumar & Rai, supra note 21, at 1748 (“Yet many of the techniques of open source require
property rights so that future users and third parties will be bound by the terms of the license.”
(emphasis in original)).
46. 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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rights in DNA sequences may turn to copyright instead.47
Recent technological advances make clear that categorical statements
about the copyrightability of DNA are not sufficient to address the
different types of information stored in DNA. The Copyright Office’s
Compendium states that “DNA sequences and other genetic, biological,
or chemical substances or compounds” as a rule do not constitute
copyrightable subject matter.48 The Compendium provides no support for
such a blanket statement other than conclusively stating that such
sequences are examples of the ideas, procedures, processes, systems,
methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries that are
excluded from copyright protection under section 102(b) of the Copyright
Act.49 But scientists are experimenting with DNA compounds as storage
devices for information seemingly overlooked by the Copyright Office.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has established the
Molecular Information Storage (MIST) research program to test DNA,
among other chemical compounds, as a storage technology “with reduced
physical footprint, power, and cost requirements relative to conventional
[digital] storage technologies.”50 Private sector companies and academic
researchers also are exploring the use of DNA for dense and durable

47. Malshe, supra note 8, at 37 (predicting that the resulting action from the Supreme Court’s
Myriad decision “is now going to be a scramble to get man-made DNA copyright protection”);
Andrew W. Torrance & Linda J. Kahl, Bringing Standards to Life: Synthetic Biology Standards and
Intellectual Property, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 199, 227 (2014) (“Now that natural-source
DNA molecules have lost their eligibility for patent protection, copyright stands ready to provide an
existing alternative form of protection.”). This Author, when in private practice, personally
experienced this increased interest in copyright protection for DNA.
48. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.3(A) (3d
ed. 2021).
49. A letter from Robert J. Kasunic, Associate Register of Copyrights and Director of Copyright
Policy and Practices in response to a request by Christopher Holman, Andrew Torrance, and Dr. Claes
Gustafsson for reconsideration of a refusal to register a specific human-constructed DNA compound
labeled the “Prancer DNA Sequence” provides a window into the reasoning behind the statement in
the Compendium. The letter states that 1) the Prancer DNA Sequence is not “within the
congressionally established categories of authorship in title 17,” 2) the Prancer DNA Sequence does
not “include a sufficient quantum of copyrightable authorship,” and 3) copyright protection is
precluded for the Prancer DNA Sequence because protection does not extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, principle, or discovery. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 119–23.
50. Molecular Information Storage (MIST), INTEL. ADVANCED RSCH. PROJECTS ACTIVITY, OFF.
OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/mist/mist-baa
[https://perma.cc/4HZ2-TLHV].
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information storage, both inside51 and outside52 of living cells. These
innovations use DNA in ways that are completely unrelated to ensuring
the development, survival, and reproduction of a living organism. For
example, researchers have encoded a video from the Warsaw Ghetto
Archives in DNA and embedded it in a pair of eyeglasses with standard
transparent lenses.53 They also constructed a 3-D printed bunny-shaped
trinket called the Stanford Bunny that contains, in the material used to
make it, DNA compounds storing the information necessary to 3-D print
another copy of the bunny.54 Some predict that as the technology
advances, the process will soon be used to create a “DNA-of-things.”55
Applications for the process may be mundane, such as a car bumper
having the instructions necessary to 3-D print a replacement in the case of
damage, or, as Drew Endy, a professor of bioengineering at Stanford
University and co-founder of the iGEM competition, has mused, the uses
may be sublime: “Imagine a societal norm in which every object must
encode the instructions for making the object. Given the incredible
information density of DNA data storage, such information could, in some
commonplace objects such as refrigerators, also include a fully
unabridged guide to rebuilding all of civilization.”56 No previous
scholarship has considered whether copyright grants exclusive rights in
DNA compounds used in this way for data storage.
This Article analyzes how the Copyright Act intersects with DNA
technology without relying on an analogy to the troubled state of
copyright protection for computer technology or on the unsupported
blanket exclusion enunciated by the Copyright Office. As long as DNA
technology is correctly situated within the Copyright Act, copyright does
not grant exclusive rights to functional, and more specifically genetic,
DNA. There is no need to divine the intent of the drafters of the Copyright
51. Seth L. Shipman, Jeff Nivala, Jeffrey D. Macklis & George M. Church, CRISPR-Cas Encoding
of a Digital Movie into the Genomes of a Population of Living Bacteria, 547 NATURE 345 (2017); Ed
Yong, Scientist Can Use CRISPR to Store Images and Movies in Bacteria, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/07/scientists-can-use-crispr-to-store-images-andmovies-in-bacteria/533400/ [https://perma.cc/NB36-HYAP].
52. Mike Brunker, Microsoft and University of Washington Researchers Set Record for DNA
Storage, MICROSOFT: THE AI BLOG (July 7, 2016), https://blogs.microsoft.com/ai/synthetic-dnastorage-milestone/#sm.0000k81a37qr6dijzdl15reujpheo [https://perma.cc/EF8Y-B8SM].
53. Julian Koch, Silvan Gantenbein, Kunal Masania, Wendelin J. Stark, Yaniv Erlich & Robert N.
Grass, A DNA-of-Things Storage Architecture to Create Materials with Embedded Memory, 38
NATURE BIOTECH. 39, 42 (2020).
54. Id. at 40.
55. Id. at 39.
56. Emily Waltz, With DNA Data Storage, 3D-Printed Bunnies Carry Their Own Blueprints, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Dec. 9, 2019), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/biomedical/devices/dna-of-things
[https://perma.cc/QQ4K-NUPY].
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Act to determine whether DNA is a new type of copyrightable work
encompassed by the statute because DNA is not a “work” at all, but rather,
a medium in which information is stored. Once DNA is recognized as the
physical object in which information is stored, that information can be
assessed for copyright protection in the same way as information stored
in any other form. Similarly, as long as verbal representations of DNA are
recognized as literary works conceptually separate from the DNA
compounds they describe, the limitations on the exclusive rights granted
by copyright to any literary work will exclude genetic DNA from
copyright protection.
Granting copyright protection for literature or music stored in DNA
compounds should not lead to categorical copyright protection for DNA
any more than copyright protection for literature written on paper or music
recorded on magnetic tape should lead to copyright protection for paper
or tape. Similarly, cellular processes or functional proteins stored in DNA
should not be protected by copyright simply because they are stored in
DNA. As long as this framework is maintained, it will be clear that even
if copyright subsists in copyrightable works stored in DNA compounds
and in verbal representations of some DNA, copyright protection does not
extend to functional genetic DNA.57
This Article contains three Parts beyond this Introduction. Part II of this
Article will discuss DNA’s role as an information technology. Part III will
address, in turn, copyright protection for 1) expressive information and
2) functional information stored in DNA compounds. Part IV will discuss
the somewhat thorny metaphysics of the scope of copyright protection for
verbal representations of DNA compounds as literary works.
I.

DNA AS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

While the motivation to construct new DNA compounds may vary
from producing better humans to manufacturing proteins to storing our
vast stores of digital data, each application of DNA technology takes
advantage of a core attribute of DNA within biological systems: the ability
of DNA to store, transfer and retrieve information.58 As Arti Rai
57. This Article uses the term “genetic” to describe DNA compounds, or portions of such
compounds, that are capable of operating in cells to produce proteins. They may be either naturally
occurring or human constructed DNA compounds.
58. Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 836 (1999) (“The CAFC’s failure to recognize DNA-based technologies
as involving information first and foremost reveals its inability to adjust existing paradigms to address
new technology.”); see also Symposium, Molecules vs. Information: Should Patents Protect Both?,
8 B.U. J. SCI . & TECH. L. 190, 198 (2002) (“DNA sequences are both molecules and information.”)
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recognized more than twenty years ago, “[a]lthough DNA is, obviously
enough, a chemical compound, it is more fundamentally a carrier of
information.”59 More recently, discussions of the various court decisions
in the dispute between the Association for Molecular Pathology and
Myriad Genetics regarding the patentability of DNA similarly reference
the information-carrying function of DNA.60
In nature, genetic DNA in living cells carries the information necessary
to produce all the proteins required for survival of the organism.61 The
information in DNA functions as the cell’s “operating system” much as
operating system programs function within computers. Living cells are
protein producing machines. Rather than taking in digital input and
producing digital output as computers do, they take in chemical input and
produce chemical output. Chemical compounds, such as enzymes or
regulatory proteins, act as the inputs to the cellular “computer” which
initiates the process of producing a particular protein. Just as the
information in a computer’s operating system operates to produce a
different output depending on the input, the information in a cell’s DNA
operates to produce a different protein depending on the chemical
compounds introduced.62
The information necessary to produce the proteins that a cell produces
is stored in DNA just as the information necessary to produce the digital
output that a computer produces is stored in computer software.63

(emphasis in original). Although Dan Burk argues against the notion that DNA patents “are in fact
drawn to ‘information,’” he does concede that DNA, as well as other biological macromolecules, “can
carry a very large amount of structural information.” Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in
Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 582–84 (2006).
59. Rai, supra note 58, at 836 (emphasis omitted).
60. Christopher M. Holman, Developments in Synthetic Biology Are Altering the IP Imperatives of
Biotechnology, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 461 (2015); see also Dan L. Burk, The Curious
Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 509 (2014);
Fitzpatrick, supra note 44, at 1385–87 (discussing the emphasis placed on the information-carrying
qualities of DNA by the Supreme Court in Myriad).
61. See Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Deoxyribonucleic-Acid-Fact-Sheet
[https://perma.cc/25WS-3SZP] [hereinafter DNA Fact Sheet].
62. DNA Fact Sheet, supra note 61; Biological Pathways Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH.
INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Biological-Pathways-Fact-Sheet
[https://perma.cc/Q579-RJ94].
63. Indeed, as both technologies continue to evolve, the relationship between software and DNA
becomes less of an analogy and more of a convergence. See Douglas Carmean, Luis Ceze, Georg
Seelig, Kendall Stewart, Karin Strauss & Max Willsey, DNA Data Storage and Hybrid MolecularElectronic Computing, 107 PROC. IEEE 63, 65–67 (2019) (proposing hybrid molecular-electronic
systems); Luis Ceze, Jeff Nivala & Karin Strauss, Molecular Digital Data Storage Using DNA, 20
NATURE REVS. GENETICS 456, 456 (2019) (referring to “the growing intersection of computer systems
and biotechnology”).
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Information is stored in DNA as four different chemical subunits. The
chemical subunits are called nucleotides and are arranged linearly along
each of the two helical strands that make up the DNA compound.64 The
order of these four chemical subunits in DNA can encode any type of
information in DNA that the order of two electronic65 states can encode in
software. In written descriptions of DNA, the four different types of
nucleotides in DNA are usually referred to by the letters A, G, C, and T66
just as in computer code the two different electronic states are referred to
as 0 and 1.
The DNA Fact Sheet from the National Human Genome Research
Institute provides a simplified example by describing how the order of
nucleotides in the DNA of a person determines eye color.67 The cells of
people with the DNA nucleotide sequence ATCGTT in their DNA might
produce the proteins that result in them having blue eyes while the cells
of people with the DNA nucleotide sequence ATCGCT might produce the
proteins that result in them having brown eyes.68
Scientists have harnessed this information-carrying quality of DNA by
altering the DNA of cells to manufacture desired proteins.69 The cells
contain DNA with human-authored nucleotide sequences that function as
operating systems not found in nature.70 Thus, altered bacterial cells
operate to produce human growth hormone.71 Altered fish cells operate to
64. DNA Fact Sheet, supra note 61.
65. Information can be stored in computer software as electromagnetic, optical, or silicon-based on
and off states, but this Article uses “electronic” as an example and for readability.
66. DNA Fact Sheet, supra note 61.
67. Id. The exact wording of the example from the DNA Fact Sheet from the National Human
Genome Research Institute is problematic in the context of copyright law. The fact sheet states that
the information contained in the sequence of A, T, C, and G nucleotides that are present in a DNA
compound “determines what biological instructions are contained in a strand of DNA. For example,
the sequence ATCGTT might instruct for blue eyes, while ATCGCT might instruct for brown.” As
explained below, the information stored in DNA should not be considered “instructions” in
determining copyrightability.
68. DNA performs this role by serving as a template in a two-step process in which DNA is
“transcribed” into RNA, which is then “translated” into protein. Proteins are constructed in cells from
a group of twenty different amino acids. A sequence of three nucleotides in a DNA compound
contains the information necessary for a cell to add a single amino acid to a protein synthesized by
the cell. Id. For example, the nucleotides CTA in sequence in a strand of DNA will add the amino
acid leucine to a protein constructed by the cell. For a more detailed description of how DNA operates
within cells, see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,
193–200 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
69. U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224, Abstract.
70. U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224, col. 1 ll. 31–41.
71. See generally David V. Goeddel, Herber L. Heyneker, Toyohara Hozumi, Rene Arentzen,
Keiichi Itakura, Daniel G. Yansura, Michael J. Ross, Giuseppe Miozzari, Roberto Crea & Peter H.
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produce proteins that fluoresce when exposed to artificial light.72
Scientists also construct cellular operating systems to produce
therapeutic73 and industrial proteins.74
Most of the DNA nucleotide sequences for these human-constructed
protein synthesis systems are authored by splicing together shorter
sequences that naturally occur in living organisms.75 However, recent
advances in DNA technology allow scientists to “write” completely novel
DNA compounds, enabling researchers to envision DNA as an
information technology to store, retrieve and send information unrelated
to protein synthesis.76 Scientists can now imagine a sequence of DNA
nucleotides, type the sequence into an online form, and receive in the mail
within a matter of days a vial containing DNA compounds of that
sequence. “With simple chemistry, strings of A, T, C and G, nucleotides
can be created in any desired order, one [nucleotide] after another,
snapping together in a similar fashion to Lego pieces.”77 Automated DNA
“printers” assemble DNA compounds of the desired sequence78 by taking
information from a computer database and controlling the valves of the
printer to assemble a DNA compound nucleotide by nucleotide.79
DNA sequencing and synthesis technology has illuminated DNA’s role
as an information technology. Because scientists are not limited to
splicing together naturally occurring DNA, DNA compounds, like digital
technology, can now be constructed and used to store nearly any type of
information, including literature, motion pictures, music, and even
computer programs.80 A manuscript authored by the scientist George
Seeburg, Direct Expression in Escherichia Coli of a DNA Sequence Coding for Human Growth
Hormone, 281 NATURE 544 (1979).
72. Leslie Pray, Recombinant DNA Technology and Transgenic Animals, 1 NATURE EDUC. 51
(2008),
https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/recombinant-dna-technology-and-transgenicanimals-34513/ [https://perma.cc/7W44-A5X9].
73. How Did They Make Insulin from Recombinant DNA?, supra note 10.
74. BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., supra note 13, at 32.
75. Such “recombinant” DNA sequences have been used to construct Escherichia coli bacteria that
produce a human protein or to cause fish to fluoresce when exposed to artificial light. See Goeddel
et al., supra note 71; Pray, supra note 72.
76. Yong, supra note 51; Koch et al., supra note 53.
77. Jerry T., How Oligos Changed the World, TWIST BIOSCI. (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://twistbioscience.com/company/blog/oligos-changed-world [https://perma.cc/TR26-C692].
78. Building Biology with Our End-to-End Automation Solutions,
https://codexdna.com/products/bioxp-system/ [https://perma.cc/P5KV-A3JU].

CODEX

DNA,

79. Stanford Law School, IP Law and the Biosciences Conference: Keynote Speaker Drew Endy,
YOUTUBE, at 21:59–23:06 (May 21, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qku3OQ5O_U4
[https://perma.cc/KD9Z-SEVM].
80. See, e.g., Nick Goldman, Paul Bertone, Siyuan Chen, Christophe Dessimoz, Emily M.

Srejovic (Do Not Delete)

472

6/21/22 10:41 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:459

Church has been stored in DNA by converting the two electronic states of
a digitally stored version into the A, T, C and G nucleotides of a DNA
compound. The A and C nucleotides took the place of one electronic state
and the T and G nucleotides took the place of the other electronic state.81
A sonnet,82 a motion picture,83 photographs,84 and the whole of
Wikipedia85 have been stored in DNA.
A team at the University of Washington stored iconic musical
performances from the Montreux Jazz Festival, the top 100 books of
Project Gutenberg, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 100
languages, and the non-profit Crop Trust’s entire seed database in DNA.86
The university currently displays a portrait of Rosalind Franklin, the
scientist who first discovered the helical structure of DNA, constructed by
collaging approximately 50,000 photographs collected from the public
and stored as synthetic DNA.87 The work of art is coated with ink mixed
with the DNA in which the photographs are stored. As explained by one
of the researchers involved in the project, if you were to scrape a bit of the
portrait off, with the right equipment you could retrieve the data and
convert the DNA compounds into digital data and then recreate the
photographs themselves.88
Digital data storage and DNA data storage are becoming
interchangeable. A computer operating system has been stored in a DNA
compound.89 The sequence of nucleotides in a DNA compound are

LeProust, Botond Sipos & Ewan Birney, Towards Practical, High-Capacity, Low-Maintenance
Information Storage in Synthesized DNA, 494 NATURE 77, 77 (2013) (sonnets, a scientific paper, a
color photographs, a speech); Brunker, supra note 52 (high definition video, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, books, a seed database); Susan Young Rojahn, An Entire Book Written in DNA,
MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/2012/08/16/184447/an-entirebook-written-in-dna/ [https://perma.cc/6YT8-KSGS] (Javascript program).
81. Ceze et al., supra note 63, at 459 fig.3; Rojahn, supra note 80.
82. Goldman et al., supra note 80, at 77.
83. Yong, supra note 51.
84. Goldman et al., supra note 80, at 77.
85. Chris Mellor, Catalog Claims DNA Data Storage Is Economically Feasible for the First Time,
BLOCKS & FILES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://blocksandfiles.com/2020/03/18/catalog-cdna-data-storageeconomically-feasible/ [https://perma.cc/N43A-7ENR].
86. Brunker, supra note 52; Kristin Osborne, #MemoriesInDNA Portrait Project Blends DNA
Technology and Art to Memorialize Pioneering Scientist Rosalind Franklin, UNIV. OF WASH. ALLEN
SCH. NEWS (Feb. 24, 2020), https://news.cs.washington.edu/2020/02/24/memoriesindna-portraitproject-blends-dna-technology-and-art-to-memorialize-pioneering-scientist-rosalind-franklin/
[https://perma.cc/NS58-7E32].
87. Osborne, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. Yaniv Erlich & Dina Zielinski, DNA Fountain Enables a Robust and Efficient Storage
Architecture, 355 SCIENCE 950, 950 (2017).
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routinely stored as digital computer data.90 In the future, DNA data storage
may supplant digital data storage. DNA data storage can be much more
efficient than data storage in software,91 is not constrained to any
particular shape,92 and is more stable than software.93 Researchers already
are looking at DNA’s potential to close the gap between the amount of
data we produce and our capacity to store it.94
Although DNA storage technology is still in its infancy, limited to
experimental as opposed to commercial uses, it introduces a new impetus
to copyright protection for DNA and a new reason to guard against its
overextension.95 The ability of DNA to store all the information necessary
to produce a copy of a photograph, a figurine, a sound recording or a
literary work in nearly any physical form serves to illustrate that DNA,
like videocassettes and computer software, is, in fact, simply the latest
available information technology. Unfortunately, these technological
advances also make it more tempting than ever for courts to equate DNA
technology with computer technology. Following the analogy to computer
programs, copyright protection could be granted to human-constructed
functional DNA compounds, in human or other cells, just as copyright
protection has been granted by courts for some functional computer
programs.

90. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.821(c), (e) (2021) (requiring nucleotide sequences submitted to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to be submitted on paper or compact disc and in computer
readable form).
91. It was estimated in 2015 that all of the worlds’ digital information could be stored in nine liters
of DNA solution. See John Markoff, DNA Storage on DNA Can Keep It Safe for Centuries, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/science/data-storage-on-dna-can-keepit-safe-for-centuries.html [https://perma.cc/NLM4-EPKF].
92. Koch et al., supra note 53, at 39 (storing data in a transparent lens and a bunny shaped figurine).
93. Sang Yup Lee, DNA Data Storage Is Closer than You Think, SCI. AM. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/dna-data-storage-is-closer-than-you-think/
[https://perma.cc/EM6H-MEPE] (pointing out that DNA compounds have remained stable for
500,000 years while the magnetic or optical media for digital data is subject to degradation in less
than 100 years).
94. Molecular Information Storage (MIST), supra note 50.
95. DNA storage technology may soon strike fear in the hearts of the owners of copyright in those
works. As Jessica Litman has recounted with respect to earlier technologies that made it easier for the
public to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted works, copyright holders may even fight the
development of such a technology or at least put limits on its functionality. See JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 177 (2006) (describing efforts to prohibit the sale of videocassette recorders,
prohibit the rental of records or computer software, require that recording devices be technologically
equipped to prevent serial copying, and prohibit circumvention of technological protection measures
controlling access to copyrightable works).
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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR INFORMATION STORED IN
DNA COMPOUNDS

Scholars have speculated about the relationship between copyright and
DNA for decades.96 Previous articles addressing the relationship between
DNA and copyright have treated human-created DNA as if it constitutes
a new type of “work” under the copyright statute, which may or may not
be entitled to protection.97 Some proponents of copyright protection have
argued that because DNA operates within cells as computer programs
operate in computers, DNA sequences, like computer programs, are works
encompassed by the definition of “literary works” in the Copyright Act
and therefore copyrightable.98 Others have argued that, alternatively, if
DNA sequences are not considered literary works, they are still within the
scope of works that Congress intended copyright to protect.99 The
Copyright Office invokes the same premise but arrives at the opposite
conclusion, finding that works such as “synthetic DNA sequences do not
fit within any of the existing categories of copyrightable authorship listed
in section 102(a) and are not an extension of copyrightable subject matter
that Congress already intended to be protected by copyright.”100
But DNA, because it functions as an information technology, does not
create a new type of “work of authorship,”101 either within the enumerated
categories of the Copyright Act or outside the scope that Congress
intended. Rather, DNA compounds are not works of authorship at all.
DNA compounds are the physical material in which copyrightable works
or other information may be fixed, in other words, “copies” under the
Copyright Act.102 It makes no more sense to ask whether DNA is
96. Kayton, supra note 8; Goldstein, supra note 27; Smith, supra note 8; Burk, supra note 28. Some
have also posed the related question of copyright protection for genetically engineered organisms. See
Kayton, supra note 8, at 218. For a discussion of copyright for genetically engineered organisms, see
Murray, supra note 8; Burk, supra note 28; Torrance, supra note 28, at 642–48; Holman et al., supra
note 8; Holman, supra note 8, at 402.
97. See Burk, supra note 28, at 495 (“[B]oth those commentators favoring rDNA copyright and
those opposing it concede that, with regard to the inclusion of a new category of works under the
statute, intent may be determined by analogy to the enumerated categories.”); Pamela Samuelson,
Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17, 84–85 (2016) (discussing
whether “synthetic biology products” or “DNA sequences” are works of authorship within the
meaning of the Copyright Act).
98. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 113.
99. Kayton, supra note 8, at 200–01 (asserting that even if “genetically engineered works” are not
literary works, they may still be works of authorship because such works are “not ‘completely outside
the present congressional intent” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 51 (1976))).
100. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 121; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 48, § 313.3(A).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
102. Id. § 101 (“‘Copies’ are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
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copyrightable than to ask whether marks on a page are copyrightable. The
information contained in those marks determines whether unauthorized
copying is prohibited. Marks on a page organized to create a novel are
clearly protected by copyright. Marks on a page that are merely tally
marks used to score a game are not. The Copyright Act may grant
exclusive rights to DNA compounds storing original works of authorship,
but no exclusive rights should be granted to genetic DNA compounds,
which store the processes of protein synthesis.
A.

The Difficulty of Separating the Information from the Object

Fundamental to the current incarnation of the copyright statute is the
notion that copyright protects “works.”103 According to the statute,
copyright subsists in works when they are fixed in a “tangible medium of
expression” (in the words of section 102(a)) or a “material object” (in the
words of section 101).104 Literary works are often fixed as ink on paper.
Motion pictures are often fixed as patterns of light sensitive chemicals on
film. Sound recordings are often fixed as patterns of magnetic particles on
tape. Of course, each of these works is also often fixed in digital form as
a pair of electrical states in computer software.
The Copyright Act and its legislative history make clear that a
copyrightable “work” is separate and distinct from the physical form in
which it exists. For example, the definition of “literary works” explicitly
disregards “the nature of the material objects . . .” in which such works
are embodied.105 Copyright protection subsists in a novel whether it is
fixed in a printed book or in a digital file. As stated in the Register of
Copyright’s Supplementary Report written during drafting of the
Copyright Act, “[a] consistent effort has been made in this section and
throughout the bill to distinguish between the ‘original work’ which is the
product of the author’s creative intellect and which is the real subject of
copyright protection and . . . the material objects embodying the

by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term ‘copies’
includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.”).
103. Id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression . . . .”); see also Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright
Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 738 (1993) (The “autonomous
work that is the product of authorial originality [is] an idea central to the current system of
copyright.”).
104. Presumably these are two terms for the same thing.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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work[].”106
Before the onset of copyright jurisprudence addressing computer
programs, the line between the “work” and the physical form of fixation
was relatively clear. A sound recording stored on tape is not copyrightable
because magnetic tape is copyrightable. The work is the music people
hear. The magnetic tape is simply the tangible medium in which the work
is fixed. The work is also distinct from the pattern of magnetic particles
on the tape. The characteristics of the information stored in that pattern
determines whether the tape may be copied without the permission of a
copyright holder. Similarly, with respect to literary works, copyright does
not depend on the physical form in which they exist. Not all letters or
words printed on paper are entitled to copyright protection. A list of names
and phone numbers on a piece of paper is not a copyrightable work of
authorship.107 A poem clearly is. A novel is copyrightable whether it is
stored with ink on paper or carved into stone.
However, in the context of computer programs, the distinction between
the “work” and its physical form has blurred. Courts often fail to
distinguish between the potentially copyrightable information and the
media in which it is fixed. Court decisions refer interchangeably to
computer programs, to the computer software in which such programs are
stored, and to the computer code in which such programs are described or
written.108 For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Google LLC v.
Oracle America109 at one point states that Google copied a portion of a
program110 and at another states that Google copied code.111 The Court
also appears to equate software with code and programs.112 Lloyd
Weinreb has discussed the failure of the court in Lotus Development
Corporation v. Paperback Software International113 “to distinguish the
program from the code . . . .”114 Similarly, the CONTU Report, relied on
by Congress to establish the scope of copyright protection for computer
programs, variably equates computer programs with copyrightable
106. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART
6: SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTER’S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW
(Comm. Print 1965).
107. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
108. For a discussion of computer programs (and genetic DNA compounds) as described in code
or existing as code, see infra section IV.
109. 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct 1183 (2021).
110. Id. at 1190.
111. Id. at 1193.
112. Id. at 1190 (referring to software as being “written” and software as carrying out tasks).
113. 740 F. Supp. 37 (1990).
114. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1155–57
(1998).
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works115 and with tangible media of expression.116
Previous commentary on copyright and DNA similarly fails to
distinguish among the physical chemical compound, the information
stored in the sequence of nucleotides in the compound, and the series of
letters often used to represent the sequence of nucleotides. Discussions of
copyright and DNA variably focus on whether “genetic works,”117
genetically engineered organisms,118 “engineered genetic sequences,”119
“r[ecombinant] DNA molecules,”120 “engineered genetic code,”121
“human-designed DNA,”122 “recombinant DNA sequences,”123 “DNA
code,”124 “DNA molecules,”125 or simply “DNA”126 are copyrightable.
Rarely, if ever, are these terms defined or the differences between them
discussed. In fact, they are often used interchangeably.127 But, the
distinction is important. It is difficult to resolve the complicated question
of copyright protection in the context of new technologies without a
commonly understood vocabulary.128 An article posing the question of
115. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (CONTU), FINAL
REPORT ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
3 COMPUT. L.J. 53, 76 (1981) (stating that when either a program or a motion picture is used in
conjunction with a properly working machine, “the same result will occur on the first, the second, or
the thousandth running.”); id. at 21 (suggesting that computer programs should be treated as
copyrighted written rules to a game).
116. See id. (stating that when either a program or a phonorecord is used in conjunction with a
properly working machine, “the same result will occur on the first, the second, or the thousandth
running.”); id. (“Programs should no more be considered machine parts than videotapes should be
considered parts of projectors or phonorecords parts of sound reproduction equipment.”).
117. Kayton, supra note 8, at 201 (1982) (stating that engineered genetic works should be
copyrightable).
118. See id. at 218; Goldstein, supra note 27, at 139; Murray, supra note 8.
119. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 103.
120. Smith, supra note 8, at 1106 (stating that because recombinant DNA molecules could be
viewed as “machine readable,” they should be copyrightable just as machine readable computer
programs).
121. Holman, supra note 8, at 401–02.
122. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 118 (“[T]he justification for maintaining copyright protection
for software while denying it for human-designed DNA becomes increasingly questionable.”).
123. Burk, supra note 28.
124. Malshe, supra note 8, at 42.
125. Torrance, supra note 8, at 35 (“DNA molecules are copyrightable . . . .”).
126. Id. (title).
127. See Holman et al., supra note 8, at 103 (referring to the copyrightability of “engineered DNA
sequences,” “genetic code” and “engineered genetic sequences” interchangeably); Torrance, supra
note 8, at 4 n.10 (“In this article, ‘gene’ and ‘DNA sequence’ are often used interchangeably, where
appropriate.”).
128. See John A. Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We Confused?, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 533, 538–40 (1986) (analogizing the difficulties that arise when people lack a shared vocabulary
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whether “DNA molecules”129 are copyrightable appears to be asking
whether a class of physical chemical compounds is protected by
copyright. An article arguing that “DNA sequences”130 are copyrightable
as literary works may be proposing that the series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs
that is often used to describe a DNA compound is copyrightable but not
the compound itself. An article discussing “DNA code”131 may simply be
arguing that a coded clue written in As, Ts, Cs, and Gs is copyrightable.
Each of these questions presents a different set of issues and requires a
different answer. Assessing copyright protection for a work in a DNA
compound or molecule is different from assessing copyright protection
for a literary work representing the compound.
The Copyright Office similarly seems to have lost sight of the
fundamental distinction between the information constituting the work of
authorship and the physical media in which it is fixed. For example, the
Copyright Office declared in its Compendium that “works” such as “DNA
sequences and other genetic, biological, or chemical substances or
compounds” as a rule do not constitute copyrightable subject matter.132 It
when discussing computer software to the difficulties that might arise when contract law must contend
with the repair of a new type of watch); id. (“If a part in a new timepiece seems to have no analog to
any part in an old watch, some watchmakers may begin to call one part a blodget, and the other a
wedge, while others call the same parts widgets and wedges . . . . The question here is whether
watches are like computer programs, or judges like watchmakers.”).
129. Smith, supra note 8, at 1106 (arguing that because recombinant DNA molecules could be
viewed as “machine readable,” they should be copyrightable just as machine readable computer
programs).
130. Burk, supra note 28.
131. It is unclear whether DNA code refers to verbal representations of DNA compounds in the
sense of computer code or whether it refers to the correspondence between the sets of three
nucleotides and the amino acids that make up proteins. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 193–200 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 20120), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
132. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 48, § 313.3(A). The Office arrived at this conclusion
despite the fact that Congress has commissioned no series of extensive studies as it did with respect
to digitally stored information. Indeed, the Compendium provides no support for such a blanket
statement other than conclusively stating that such sequences are examples of the ideas, procedures,
processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries that are excluded from
copyright protection under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. A letter from Robert J. Kasunic,
Associate Register of Copyrights and Director of Copyright Policy and Practices, in response to a
request by Christopher Holman and Andrew Torrance and Dr. Claes Gustafsson for reconsideration
of a refusal to register a specific human-constructed DNA compound labeled the “Prancer DNA
Sequence,” provides a window into the reasoning behind the statement in the Compendium. The letter
states that 1) the Prancer DNA Sequence is not “within the congressionally established categories of
authorship in title 17;” 2) the Prancer DNA Sequence does not “include a sufficient quantum of
copyrightable authorship,” and 3) copyright protection is precluded for the Prancer DNA Sequence
because protection does not extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
principle, or discovery. Holman et al., supra note 8, at 119.
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is unclear what the Copyright Office means by the term “DNA
sequences,” but “genetic, biological, or chemical substances or
compounds” such as DNA compounds are not a class of works of
authorship that potentially constitute copyrightable subject matter. They
are not works at all. “Substances and compounds” are tangible media.
They should be considered “copies” in which a copyrightable work or
some other creation may be fixed. Just as with paper and ink or magnetic
tape, to determine whether copyright prohibits the copying of a particular
DNA compound, one should examine the information, the potential “work
of authorship,” stored in it.
The difficulty in conceiving of the information stored in a DNA
compound separately from the tangible compound itself is not limited to
the context of copyright. In the seminal patent case Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,133 one disagreement between
the parties centered around whether the term “sequence” in Myriad’s
patent claims referred to, as Myriad wrote in its brief on appeal, “mere
genetic information” rather than a physical molecule.134 The issue was
important because, as the Supreme Court recognized, the value of a patent
claim in DNA is attributable more to the information contained in the
sequence of nucleotides in the DNA than to “the specific chemical
composition of a particular molecule.”135 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court’s holding in the case did little to settle that particular dispute.136 The
Court’s decision states that, despite decades in which the Patent Office
granted patents for DNA sequences consisting of partial genes, “genes
and the information they encode are not patent eligible.”137
More than ten years earlier, comments by Rebecca Eisenberg at a
Boston University symposium panel entitled Molecules vs. Information:
Should Patents Protect Both? foreshadowed the resulting reversal of
fortunes for biotechnology companies.138 According to Eisenberg,
squeamishness about patenting DNA sequences was largely due to a
feeling that patenting them is akin to patenting information. As part of a
panel discussing whether patents should protect both DNA molecules and
133. 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
134. Brief for Respondents at 53–54, Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL
860315, at *53–54.
135. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. at 593.
136. In contrast to the lack of precision of the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Myriad,
the Federal Court of Australia distinguished between the genetic information stored in DNA and DNA
as a tangible material. The Australian court stated that patent claims to the tangible DNA compound
“could never be infringed by someone who merely reproduced a DNA sequence in written or digitised
form.” Cancer Voices Austl. v Myriad Genetics, Inc. (2013) 99 IPR 567, 581.
137. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. at 596 (emphasis added).
138. Symposium, supra note 58.

Srejovic (Do Not Delete)

480

6/21/22 10:41 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:459

the information they contain, Eisenberg recognized, “in the early days,
patenting genes looked like patenting drugs,” but since the attempts of the
National Institutes of Health to patent expressed sequence tags139 during
the Human Genome Project, “it looks more like patenting scientific
information.”140
But no matter how difficult the task, in order to determine the proper
scope of copyright protection, the underlying information must be
identified separately from the DNA compound in which it is fixed in order
to evaluate the potentially copyrightable “original work[] of
authorship.”141 The difficulty of separating the DNA compound, itself,
from the information stored in DNA is a hurdle that must be cleared to
determine the proper scope of copyright protection for information stored
in DNA. As explained by the House Report to the Copyright Act, there is
“a fundamental distinction between the ‘original work’ which is the
product of ‘authorship’ and the multitude of material objects in which it
can be embodied.”142 The nature of the physical form in which the
information is fixed does not determine the copyrightability of the
work.143 DNA is simply a new type of material object in which a
copyrightable work may be fixed rather than a new type of copyrightable
work.
In addition, failing to distinguish between the physical molecule and
the information that is the copyrightable work can lead to erroneous
conclusions. If the work protected by copyright is confused with the
compound in which that information is stored, a finding that copyright
prohibits the reproduction of one DNA compound could lead to the
conclusion that copyright prohibits the reproduction of DNA compounds
in general.144 If the literary work describing or representing a DNA
compound is confused with the compound itself, copyright protection for
a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs could lead to the extension of copyright
protection to the DNA compound described by that string of letters.145

139. Expressed sequence tags, or ESTs, are polynucleotide molecules that have the nucleotide
sequence of a short segment of cDNA.
140. Symposium, supra note 58, at 191.
141. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
142. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
143. Id.
144. See infra section III.C.
145. See infra section IV.
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Copyright Subsists in Original Works of Authorship Fixed in DNA
Compounds

Although the Copyright Act clearly states that copyright protection
subsists in “original works of authorship,” the statute lacks a definition of
those “works,” the very creation in which copyright subsists.146 The
failure to define the work was not an oversight. Indeed, the legislative
history to the Act states that “[t]he phrase ‘original works of authorship,’
[] is purposely left undefined.”147 The only guidance provided by the
statute is a list of eight “illustrative but not limitative”148 categories of
“works of authorship”: literary works; musical works; dramatic works;
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings;
and architectural works.149
As described in section II, above, a sonnet and a manuscript,150 sculpted
bunny figurines,151 a recording of a musical performance,152
photographs,153 and movies154 have each been stored in humanconstructed DNA compounds. If original, such literary works, sculptural
works, sound recordings, graphical works, and motion pictures surely
qualify as protectable works of authorship under the Copyright Act.
Counter to the guidance provided by the Copyright Office’s
Compendium,155 which would disqualify works of authorship from
copyright protection simply because they are fixed as a DNA compound,
the copyright protection afforded to any one of these creations should not,
and practically cannot, depend on the tangible media of expression in
which they are fixed. The fact that a work is embodied in a DNA
compound does not exclude it from copyright protection any more than
the fact that a work is embodied in ink on a page should compel the result
that it is entitled to copyright protection.
A DNA compound is simply a new tangible medium of expression in
which works may be permanently and stably fixed. Copyright subsists in
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
147. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 50 (1975).
148. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53; S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 52; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., rev. ed. 2022).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
150. Goldman et al., supra note 80, at 77; Ceze et al., supra note 63, at 459 fig.3; Rojahn, supra
note 80.
151. Koch et al., supra note 53.
152. Osborne, supra note 86.
153. Goldman et al., supra note 80, at 84.
154. Yong, supra note 51.
155. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 48, § 313.3(A).
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original works when they are fixed in a “tangible medium of
expression,”156 and the Copyright Act explains that a work is “fixed” in a
material object157 when it “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.”158 Fixing a work of authorship as
nucleotides in a DNA compound allows it to be perceived and reproduced
as required by the statute. With the aid of DNA sequencing machines and
computers, the order of nucleotides in a DNA compound may be “read”
and translated first into digital form and then into a manuscript, musical
performance, or movie that can be perceived by humans. DNA
compounds can be reproduced either chemically or within cells.159 DNA
compounds are extremely stable, more stable than any available digital
technology.160 Scientists, with the aid of DNA sequencing technology,
have been able to sequence or “read” the sequence of nucleotides in the
DNA from a 700,000-year-old horse bone fragment.161 The legislative
history of the Copyright Act clearly shows that the drafters contemplated
that a work may be fixed in a medium that did not exist at the time of the
drafting.162 In addition, the statute explicitly states that perception and
reproduction with the aid of a machine or device is sufficient.163
Under the Copyright Act the owner of the copyright in a sonnet should
have the exclusive right to reproduce the work in DNA as well as in paper
copies.164 The same should be true of any other copyrightable work fixed
in a DNA compound. Copyright protection for works such as
photographs, sculptures, motion pictures, or novels stored in DNA
compounds is equivalent to copyright protection for such works in digital
information technology. Copyright should subsist in a motion picture
whether it is fixed on film, video tape, DNA, or a digital storage device

156. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
157. Such material objects are defined as “copies” under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(defining “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed”).
159. Ceze et al., supra note 63, at 459 fig.3.
160. Id. at 456.
161. Craig D. Millar & David M. Lambert, Towards a Million-Year-Old Genome, 499 NATURE 34
(2013).
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining copies as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed”).
163. Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5666
(stating a copy is intended “to comprise all of the material objects in which copyrightable works are
capable of being fixed”).
164. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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such as a DVD.
However, it is important to keep in mind that this conclusion implies
nothing about the “copyrightability of DNA” because DNA is not the
work. The information stored in the form of the sequence of nucleotides
in a DNA compound are the works: the literary work, the motion picture,
and the sound recording. The DNA compound is simply the tangible
medium in which they are fixed. If the information stored in a DNA
compound is kept conceptually separate from the physical DNA
compound, it is clear that copyright subsists in an original literary work,
motion picture, or sound recording fixed as a series of nucleotides in a
DNA compound. The original work of authorship is the literary work,
motion picture, or sound recording. The work is fixed in the tangible
medium of DNA. According to the definitions contained in the statute, the
DNA compound in which that work is fixed is a “copy”165 of that work.166
If the information stored in a DNA compound is an original literary work,
motion picture, or sound recording, § 106 of the Copyright Act grants the
exclusive right to reproduce and distribute that work in DNA compounds.
C.

Copyright and Functional Information Stored in DNA Compounds

Although a DNA compound may be a “copy”167 in which a
copyrightable work is embodied, that fact does not compel the conclusion
that anything embodied in a DNA compound is a copyrightable work.168
As recognized in the House Report accompanying the bill which led to
the 1976 Copyright Act, “[i]t is possible to have an ‘original work of
authorship’ without having a ‘copy’ or ‘phonorecord’ embodying it, and
it is also possible to have a ‘copy’ or ‘phonorecord’ embodying something
that does not qualify as an ‘original work of authorship.’”169 How then
should we analyze copyright protection for genetic DNA, which embodies
the process of protein synthesis rather than a novel or motion picture?
Prior scholarship has premised the possibility of copyright protection

165. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
166. In discussing the use of the genetic code to construct an encrypted message, Cooper also
suggests that a DNA molecule may be a “copy.” However, it is unclear what he means by this
suggestion because he continues by erroneously concluding that if a DNA molecule constitutes a copy
of a literary work, the DNA molecule is copyrightable. COOPER, supra note 29, § 14:3. Under the
Copyright Act, copyright subsists in a work of authorship not in a copy. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
167. Id.
168. Indeed, to do so would be to revert to earlier copyright statutes in which works that take certain
forms are entitled to copyright protection. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124
(granting copyright protection to books, maps, and charts).
169. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
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for genetic DNA on an analogy between DNA and digital technology.170
For example, genes have been equated with computer software,171
“engineered genetic works” have been compared to computer
programs,172 and DNA compounds have been viewed as computer
programs fixed in software.173 The logic of copyright protection for
computer code has been applied to “DNA code.”174 But arguing for
copyright protection for engineered genetic works or genes based on an
analogy to computer programs risks importing the same logical missteps
that plague copyright protection for computer programs.
One such misconception is the characterization of computer programs
as “instructions.” Even the Copyright Act itself defines a computer
program as “statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in
a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”175 But as recognized
by Lloyd Weinreb in discussing computer programs, “there is nothing that
can be described as ‘statements or instructions’ except as an elaborate
metaphor.”176 Rather, a computer program is more accurately compared
to a part of a machine or the process carried out by a machine. Therefore,
as Weinreb notes, “a program . . . is not copyrightable, any more than are
170. Kayton, supra note 8, at 201 (Engineered genetic works “are certainly analogous, if not nearly
identical, to computer programs . . . [and b]ecause of this similarity . . . should be copyrightable.”);
Holman et al., supra note 8, at 118 (“[T]he justification for maintaining copyright protection for
software while denying it for human-designed DNA becomes increasingly questionable.”); Torrance,
supra note 28, at 648 (“[S]ynthetic biology is well on the way towards cells as computers and genes
as computer software. The consequences for the copyrightability of synthetic DNA sequences are
significant.”); Burk, supra note 28, at 472 (“[A]dvocates on both sides of the DNA copyright debate
have discussed the analogy between computer software and recombinant DNA . . . .”); Goldstein,
supra note 27, at 139 (“The strongest reason for arguing . . . that polynucleotide molecules [including
DNA] are appropriate media of expression for genetic works is by analogy with the computer
world.”); Smith, supra note 8, at 1106 (describing “[t]he issues surrounding the scope of protection
of a copyrighted computer program” as “also pertinent to copyrighted rDNA”).
171. Torrance, supra note 28, at 648 (“[S]ynthetic biology is well on the way towards cells as
computers and genes as computer software. The consequences for the copyrightability of synthetic
DNA sequences are significant.”).
172. Kayton, supra note 8, at 201 (noting engineered genetic works “are certainly analogous, if not
nearly identical, to computer programs . . . [and b]ecause of this similarity . . . should be
copyrightable”).
173. Smith, supra note 8, at 1106 (arguing because recombinant DNA molecules could be viewed
as “machine readable,” they should be copyrightable just as machine readable computer programs).
174. Malshe, supra note 8, at 42 (questioning the logic of protection for “computer code” while
denying it to “DNA code”).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Lloyd Weinreb points out that the definition of computer program in the
Copyright Act as “instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about
a certain result” at the very least confuses the computer code with the computer program. Weinreb,
supra note 114, at 1157. “Although the description of programs as ‘statements or instructions’ plainly
refers to the program code, the reference to use ‘in a computer’ can refer only to the program in
operation.” Id.
176. Weinreb, supra note 114, at 1157.
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the gears that operate the shift of a car or the shifting of the gears itself.”177
DNA sequences have been similarly characterized as “instructions.”178
But just as computer programs are not instructions, the information in
DNA compounds does not function as instructions for the processes
carried out in cells. There is no one to instruct.179 The sequence of
nucleotides in a DNA compound does not describe the technology or
provide instructions on how to use it. Rather, just as a “computer carries
out the program by means of the flow of current through electronic
circuitry [and] needs no instructions (and could follow none were they
given),”180 a cell carries out the process of protein synthesis by means of
chemical reactions and neither needs nor is capable of following
instructions.
To apply Weinreb’s language to the context of DNA, DNA “requires
us to replace our concrete conception of a machine as a physical object
with the abstraction of a means to perform a function.”181 In the context
of patent protection for DNA technology, both courts and commentators
have been more adept at recognizing the role of DNA compounds in that
abstraction. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, rather than existing as
passive instructions followed by actors in a process, “[t]he majority of
genes act by guiding the production of polypeptide chains that form
proteins.”182 In discussing the application of patent law to modern
biotechnology, Dan Burk has suggested that “[r]ather than comparisons
to blueprints and [instructions], DNA might better be compared to a cog
in a [genetic information expression] machine.”183
177. Id. at 1168. In this quotation, Professor Weinreb appears to be treating the “program” either
as fixed in hardware or software (in which case it is analogous to the gears) or as the process operating
in the computer (in which case it is analogous to the shifting of the gears). The statement is true in
either case.
178. See COOPER, supra note 29, § 14:6 (“A DNA base sequence may be compared to a rule book
(a set of instructions for playing a game), to a recipe (a set of instructions for making a complex
chemical substance), and to a blueprint or architectural plan (a set of instructions for constructing a
physical structure).”); Torrance, supra note 8, at 33 (“A gene is a set of instructions for producing a
polypeptide.”).
179. See Samuelson, supra note 97, at 727 (distinguishing between a book which contains a set of
instructions and a computer program in machine-readable form which contains a set of instructions
by clarifying that “[t]he former informs a human being about how the task might be done; the latter
does the task”).
180. Weinreb, supra note 114, at 1157.
181. Id. at 1169.
182. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off., 689 F.3d 1303, 1310 (2012)
(emphasis added), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
183. Burk, supra note 58, at 583 (noting that this genetic information expression machine in which
DNA is a cog is analogous to “Babbage’s famous ‘difference engine,’ the conceptual precursor to
modern computing, which was intended to accomplish complicated numerical calculations by means
of mechanical gears”).
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If genetic DNA compounds are cogs in cellular machinery, how should
we think about the information stored in those compounds?184 Genetic
DNA still has the qualities of an information technology, but unlike the
DNA compounds discussed in section III.B, the stored information is not
a novel, sculpture, or sound recording. Rather, genetic DNA compounds
contain information that can be more accurately described either as 1) an
alternative representation of a protein or 2) the process of protein
synthesis (the shifting of the gears).185 This dual nature of the stored
information is not unique to DNA. Indeed, any information that is
perceptible only through the aid of a machine can be considered either a
representation of the output of the machine or part of a process conducted
by the machine which produces the output. The information stored on a
magnetic tape of a sound recording may be considered either a
representation of the sound recording or part of the sound producing
process conducted by a tape recorder.
More specifically, in the first option, the information stored in a genetic
DNA compound can be considered a representation of the protein (or
proteins) that would result from the chemical processes of transcription
and translation that occur in a cell. The “genetic code,” the direct
correspondence of the sequence of nucleotides in a DNA compound to the
sequence of amino acids in a protein, allows the nucleotide sequence to
provide the information necessary to construct the protein. As recognized
by Eisenberg, in naturally occurring living organisms, “[o]ne can think of
DNA as a tangible storage medium for information . . . about the structure
of proteins.”186 In other words, for the purpose of assessing copyright
protection, the information fixed in a DNA compound may be the protein
itself.187 It follows that because a protein is a useful object, it should be

184. Burk grapples with the distinction between the physical DNA compound and the information
it stores and discusses this metaphysical question in attempting to differentiate between patents that
claim exclusive ownership of a product versus those that claim ownership of a process. Id. at 587. He
notes that “[t]he novelty and value of biotechnological inventions [including those related to DNA]
lie in their processes, which are determined by their structures.” Id. “But molecular structure defines
the parameters for such a process, and structure falls formally into the category of products.” Id.
185. Following Weinreb’s comparison of computer programs to the gears that operate the shift of
a car, it may be tempting to alternatively consider the information stored in genetic DNA compounds
as a machine part. I think that it is more accurate to consider the DNA compound or in the case of
computer technology, the computer software, as being a machine part.
186. Symposium, supra note 58, at 196. Andrew Torrance recognizes the equivalence between the
information stored in a genetic DNA compound and a protein when he explicitly uses DNA as
shorthand for DNA, RNA, and proteins. See Torrance, supra note 8, at 28.
187. Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance
Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 69 (1996) (“[T]he relationship
between the DNA and the protein(s) it codes for, rather than the actual DNA sequence, creates
value.”).
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treated as any other useful object when assessing copyright protection.
Unless a protein is designed for its beauty188 as well as the function of its
structure, there would be no features eligible for copyright protection as
separately identifiable from the utilitarian aspects of the compound.189 The
DNA compound may be entitled to patent protection, but not copyright.
Alternatively, just as a computer program can be compared to a process
(“the shifting of the gears” of a car),190 the information stored in genetic
DNA can be considered part of a process (the process of protein synthesis
in a cell). When an input in the form of an enzyme is introduced, it
interacts with the nucleotide sequence of a genetic DNA compound
causing the cell to start a series of chemical reactions to produce an output
in the form of protein. The order of nucleotides in genetic DNA
compounds contains the information necessary to construct the protein,
complete with the information for so-called start and stop codons to start
and stop the process.
Genetic DNA compounds that occur in nature, which are used by cells
to produce a different protein depending on the enzyme used as an input,
present a particularly compelling case for treating the information in such
compounds as a process rather than an alternative form of representing a
protein. Every cell in a living organism contains the same set of DNA
compounds. Those compounds contain the information necessary to
produce all the proteins necessary for survival of the organism. An
enzyme acts as the input to the cellular “computer” which initiates the
process of producing a protein. Just as the information in a computer’s
operating system operates to produce a different output depending on the
input, the information in a cell’s DNA operates to produce a different
protein depending on the enzyme introduced.191 Because of the multiple
outputs which can be produced by the process stored in such DNA
compounds, the information they store seems more accurately described
as the process itself rather than a representation of any one of the many
possible outputs. If characterized as a process, the information stored in a
genetic DNA compound is excluded from copyright protection under
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which explicitly prohibits the extension of
copyright protection to any “procedure, process, system, [or] method of
188. BEAUTIFULCHEMISTRY.NET, https://www.beautifulchemistry.net/protein-structures [https://
perma.cc/8V54-NZLJ].
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
190. Weinreb, supra note 114, at 1168.
191. To further the analogy, DNA is stored in the nucleus or the ROM of the cellular computer.
See Goldstein, supra note 27, at 140 (“[I]t seems that DNA molecules and ROMs are not that different
when viewed as functional information storage and processing media.”). An enzyme works as an
input which causes the cell to transfer the data stored in the nucleus (ROM) in the form of DNA to
ribosomes (RAM) through the use of mRNA.
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operation.”192
Perhaps fortunately, distinguishing between the characterizations of the
information contained in genetic DNA compounds as either an alternative
representation of a protein or the process of producing a protein is not
necessary to assess copyright protection. Information representing a
protein should be excluded from copyright protection as utilitarian.
Alternatively, if the information stored in genetic DNA compounds is
characterized as the process of protein synthesis193 then under § 102(b),
copyright protection for that information is excluded and reproducing it
in DNA compound “copies” is not prohibited by the Copyright Act. Thus,
whether the information stored in genetic DNA is characterized as a
representation of a protein or as the process by which proteins are
synthesized, because of its functionality, it is excluded from copyright
protection.
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR VERBAL
REPRESENTATIONS OF DNA COMPOUNDS
As described in section II, a DNA compound is often represented as a
series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs. These verbal representations of DNA
compounds may be recorded on paper or in a digital database. For
example, a DNA “sequence listing” required by the United States Patent
Office is a long string of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs, submitted as a digital text
file.194 Verbal representations of DNA compounds also regularly appear
in scientific periodicals.195 Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies,
192. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
193. It is true that scientists believe that there is some portion of naturally occurring genetic DNA
that has no function in the process of protein synthesis. If human-constructed genetic DNA
compounds contain such nonfunctional portions, that (presumably worthless) aspect of the DNA
compound could arguably be protected by copyright as expressive and not excluded by § 102(b).
194. See MPEP § 2422.03 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, June 2020).
195. Consider the case of a verbal representation of a DNA compound written as AATCGC and
included within the context of a longer piece of written text, such as a research article published in a
scientific journal. Certainly, the article is a “literary work” as defined by the copyright statute. As
long as the article complies with the originality and fixation requirements, copyright subsists in the
research article including the verbal representation of a DNA compound just as it does in any other
scientific article. It is certainly conceivable that copying the sequence AATCGC from a scientific
article disclosing the synthesis, function, and characteristics of a human constructed DNA compound
with that sequence would be infringing. For example, the Southern District of New York has stated
that if a defendant copied only the word SUPERCALIFRAGILISTICEXPIALIDOCIOUS in the
context of the lyrics to a song “they conceivably might still be liable for infringement.” Life Music,
Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Thus, someone copying the
letters AATCGC representing a DNA compound may be liable for infringement of the copyright in
the research article. As with any copyrighted work, in order to assess infringement, considerations
such as the amount of the work copied and the importance of the copied portion would need to be
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as well as the United States government, maintain vast databases of these
verbal representations of DNA compounds. For example, the GenBank®
database of the National Institutes of Health provides a searchable
annotated collection of verbal representations of all publicly available
DNA compounds.196 Compilations of verbal representations of DNA
compounds are used to diagnose disease,197 place someone at a crime
scene,198 or identify someone’s ethnic heritage.199 Copyright protection
for these databases as works in their entirety has already been discussed
by others,200 but in this section, I will address copyright protection for the
individual verbal representations of DNA compounds.
Because the information contained in a DNA compound can more
easily be searched and manipulated when it is in the form of As, Ts, Cs,
and Gs than in the chemical compound, the sequence of As, Ts, Cs, and
Gs representing a DNA compound may be more valuable than the
chemical compound itself to those who seek exclusive rights to the
information.201 This is even more true now than it was in 2001 when
Rebecca Eisenberg presciently recognized that “the informational value
of [DNA] sequences—by which I mean the value of simply knowing what
the sequence is—is becoming more significant relative to the material
value of having access to a molecule that embodies that information.”202
addressed. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 148, § 13.03. In addition, the limitations on copyright
protection due to functional aspects discussed in this Article should also apply.
196. GenBank
Overview,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFO.,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/ [https://perma.cc/DST8-TRHU].
197. The 100,000 Genomes Project Pilot Investigators, 100,000 Genomes Pilot on Rare-Disease
Diagnosis in Health Care—Preliminary Report, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1868 (2021).
198. Peter Aldhous, The Arrest of a Teen on an Assault Charge Has Sparked New Privacy Fears
About DNA Sleuthing, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-parabon-gedmatch-assault [https://perma.cc/47YJ-9GQL].
199. ANCESTRY.COM, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/ [https://perma.cc/T9M6-YHDP].
200. See Ray K. Harris & Susan Stone Rosenfield, Copyright Protection for Genetic Databases,
45 JURIMETRICS 225 (2005); M. Scott McBride, Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Protection,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1331 (2002); see also Pamela Samuelson, Functional Compilations, 54
HOUS. L. REV. 321 (2016). According to McBride, a scientist seeking to copy the valuable aspect of
a database, the verbal representations of individual DNA compounds, “would not infringe the
scientist’s copyright so long as the competitor does not use the same selection or arrangement as the
scientist’s copyrighted database.” McBride, supra, at 1349. (It is unclear whether McBride arrives at
this conclusion in the context of databases of human created as well as naturally occurring DNA
compounds.) Thus, any copyright protection for the individual verbal representations of DNA
compounds recorded in a database would be dependent on their existence as separate and independent
copyrightable works in themselves. If the DNA compounds represented in the database are human
constructed, the database may instead be regarded as a collective work under the Copyright Act. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective work” as “a work, . . . in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole”).
201. Symposium, supra note 58, at 196–97.
202. Id.
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Now more than ever, “knowing the DNA sequence . . . gives you an
information base that facilitates future discoveries; and that is
often . . . more significant than the tangible value of having access to the
gene.”203
Accordingly, those seeking exclusive rights to the information
contained in DNA compounds have tried multiple strategies other than
seeking exclusive rights to the DNA compound itself. Companies have
established databases of the nucleotide sequences of DNA compounds
and restricted access by offering licenses to the databases under the terms
of subscription agreements.204 Others have attempted to patent the
information contained in an organism by disclosing the complete
nucleotide sequence as a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs and claiming
exclusive rights to a computer medium recording the entire sequence, a
fragment of the sequence, or a sequence that is at least 99.9 percent
identical to the sequence.205 Some have even claimed copyright in the
verbal representation of DNA compounds.206
A.

Verbal Representations of DNA Compounds as Literary Works

Nearly any series of letters or numbers qualifies as a “literary work”
under the definition in the Copyright Act.207 A nonsensical book of letters

203. Id. at 198.
204. See id. at 199.
205. Id.
206. See Torrance, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting a letter sent to a customer of a gene sequencing
company claiming rights in short segments of DNA called oligonucleotides, “[i]f you reproduce these
oligonucleotide sequences for viewing outside your institution (e.g. journal publication), you must
affix the following copyright notice to the sequences: Oligonucleotide sequences ©2006 Illumina,
Inc. All rights reserved”); see also Willem P.C. Stemmer, How to Publish DNA Sequences with
Copyright Protection, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 217 (2002) (proposing distribution of verbal
representations of DNA compounds as MP3 files). In a discussion of the commercial and legal
implications of the Human Genome Project, the Committee on Mapping and Sequencing the Human
Genome of the National Research Council was seduced by the fact that human genes can be
represented as a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs to assume that although any new materials developed
during the project would be protected by patent, the potential intellectual property mechanism for
protecting human genome sequences would be copyright. COMM. ON MAPPING & SEQUENCING THE
HUMAN GENOME, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME 99–100
(1988) (“Should it be possible to copyright sequences from the human genome and, if so, by
whom? . . . This committee believes that human genome sequences should be a public trust and
therefore should not be subject to copyright.”).
207. “Literary works” are defined by the Copyright Act as “works . . . expressed in words,
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which
they are embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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to be used to decipher code is a literary work.208 The series of 0s and 1s
that represent a computer program is a literary work. There seems no
reason to exclude a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs from the definition of
literary work. It easily complies with the single requirement set forth in
the definition of “literary works” that it be expressed in verbal symbols or
indicia.209
But if we conclude that copyright subsists in a literary work that is a
series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs, what does this mean for copyright and DNA?
Is any series of the letters A, T, C and G a “DNA sequence?”210 In his
article discussing copyright protection for DNA, Andrew Torrance
describes a yearly Mystery Hunt conducted by students from MIT. One
year, students wrote a coded puzzle clue using a series of As, Ts, Cs, and
Gs.211 In order to interpret the clue, it was necessary to apply the rules of
the genetic code to convert the series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs into the letters
representing the twenty amino acids in proteins. The resulting letters
spelled out the clue in English. Some commentators have implied that the
copyrightability of the clue has implications for the copyrightability of
DNA.212 Indeed, at the end of his recitation of the MIT game, Andrew
Torrance concludes that even “DNA sequences” that serve the more
208. See Reiss v. Nat’l Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that a book
of words with no meaning may be a copyrightable work).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 101. It may be possible to argue that letters are components of words, and
therefore not verbal symbols, but given the expansive language of the statute that indicates there are
verbal symbols or indicia other than words, such an argument would be difficult to sustain.
210. Discussions of DNA technology and copyright often pose the question “Are DNA sequences
copyrightable?” See Burk, supra note 28, at 1299 (“For nearly three decades, academics have toyed
off and on with the question of copyright protection for recombinant DNA sequences.”); Stephen R.
Wilson, Copyright Protection for DNA Sequences: Can the Biotech Industry Harmonize Science with
Song?, 44 JURIMETRICS 409, 423 (2004) (discussing “attain[ing] copyright protection for DNA
sequences by transforming them into digital music files”); Torrance, supra note 8, at 29 (“DNA
sequences should be eligible for copyright protection.”); Torrance, supra note 28, at 648 (discussing
consequences for the “copyrightability of synthetic DNA sequences”); Holman et al., supra note 8, at
103 (“[T]he argument in favor of extending copyright to engineered DNA sequences has only gotten
stronger . . . .”). However, there are exceptions. See Smith, supra note 8, at 1099 (“Copyright appears
to be a viable alternative for the protection of intellectual property rights to rDNA molecules.”);
Torrance, supra note 8, at 35 (“DNA molecules are copyrightable . . . .”). The term “DNA sequence”
might have relevance in scientific communications as used to refer to the order of nucleotides in a
DNA compound. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (defining “nucleotide sequence” as the “linear order of DNA
nucleotides that make up a polynucleotide, such as a gene”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
211. Shotgun Wedding, MICH. INST. TECH.,
shotgun_wedding/ [https://perma.cc/G9WF-3GFV].

http://web.mit.edu/puzzle/www/2005/setec/

212. Andrew Torrance states that this “DNA sequence” would be “readily eligible for copyright
protection” due to it “having little or no functionality and abundant expression” and implies that this
has some relevance to the copyrightability of DNA generally. Torrance, supra note 8, at 36; see also
Samuelson, supra note 97, at 85.
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traditional purpose of participating in the cellular process of making
proteins may qualify for copyright protection “to the extent that function
does not dictate structure, and expression is not unduly constrained.”213
But, a clue written in As, Ts, Cs, and Gs is not a “DNA sequence.” It
is simply a game clue written in code. This puzzle clue is copyrightable
to the same extent any other coded message would be. In addition, the fact
that it may be copyrightable means nothing for the copyrightability of
DNA compounds generally. Granting copyright protection to a code
written to be deciphered using the rules of the genetic code says nothing
about the copyrightability of DNA. Imprecisely labelling the As, Ts, Cs,
and Gs that make up the puzzle clue a “DNA sequence” implies that the
series should be treated under the copyright law differently than other
literary works, and that the copyrightability of this clue has some impact
on the copyrightability of DNA compounds in general.214
It should be clear from this example that the letters A, T, C, and G can
represent any number of things. Conversely, any four letters or symbols
could be used to represent a DNA compound in a writing or in a digital
database. There is no rule of construction that excludes certain sequences
of four letters from representing DNA compounds. Nor is there a rule of
construction that defines certain sequences of four letters as necessarily
representing DNA compounds. The only circumstance in which copyright
protection to a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs has any relevance to copyright
protection for DNA technology is if that series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs
represents a DNA compound.
So, let’s consider copyright protection for a literary work consisting of
an original series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs that is a verbal representation of a
DNA compound. A written series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs representing the
sequence of nucleotides in a DNA compound certainly meets the minimal
statutory requirements of a “literary work” in the same way that the 0s and
1s of computer object code and nonsense words215 meet that requirement.
However, while it may be a literary work that describes a new chemical
compound, describing a new physical entity does not make it a new type
of literary work. Copyright protection for such a work should be subject
to the limitations that apply to any other copyrightable work. Most
relevant to information technologies such as DNA, and perhaps most
confounding, are the limitations set forth in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act,
which provides, “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,

213. Torrance, supra note 8, at 3.
214. Id. at 36.
215. Reiss v. Nat’l Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”216
For the purpose of copyright law, there are two ways to metaphysically
conceive of literary works that are representations of DNA compounds.
The first is to consider the literary work to be separate and apart from the
underlying information stored in the DNA compound. In this formulation,
the literary work describes the DNA compound. The second is to consider
the literary work as an alternative manifestation of the DNA compound.
In this formulation, the literary work functions in the same way as the
DNA compound to store the information that is in the compound. At first
blush, it seems ridiculous to equate a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs with a
DNA compound. However, evidence from copyright jurisprudence in the
context of computer technology points to the second formulation as being
more convincing to courts. With either formulation, as long as one stays
on the path, either fork leads to the same destination, a place where
copyright protection does not extend to functional genetic DNA.
B.

The Scope of Copyright for Verbal Representations as Descriptions
of DNA Compounds

Under the first formulation, a verbal representation of a DNA
compound is a literary work which describes the DNA compound. Under
well settled doctrine concerning copyright in literary works, it is the
literary work itself, or in other words, “the language that an author uses to
explain, describe, or express whatever ideas or useful arts she may have
discovered or created that copyright protects.”217 Thus, although
Einstein’s articles laying out the special and general theories of relativity
were copyrightable literary works, copyright protection did not extend to
the core equations, such as the famous E=mc2.218 Similarly, even if a
verbal representation describing a DNA compound were found to be
original enough to garner copyright protection, no exclusive rights to the
described DNA compound would be granted by copyright. To use a visual
analogy, a lithograph of a paint can does not grant protection to the paint
can itself. The artist Wayne Thiebaud has created several paintings and
lithographs depicting cans of paint. The copyright that subsists in those

216. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
217. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope
of Its Protections, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1936 (2007); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-388, at 23 (1993)
(“[A] certificate of registration on a scientific treatise would not extend to a formula contained therein,
although it would extend to an original explanation of the formula.”).
218. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997).
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works of art does not prohibit someone from manufacturing the cans
depicted.
An example may be useful. A recent case in which Judge Seibel of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York bent
over backward to explain to a pro se plaintiff what copyright does and
does not protect provides an example of how this concept may be applied
to the functional aspects of copyrightable works. In Perry v. Mary Ann
Liebert, Inc.,219 the court’s decision explained why the defendant’s figure
depicting a modified metabolic pathway invented by the plaintiff did not
infringe the plaintiff’s own figure depicting the pathway. Judge Seibel
relied on the differences between the colors and shapes used in the
defendant’s figure and those used in the plaintiff’s figure to find
noninfringement.220 The court found that the similarities between
“Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s diagrams, few as they are, are the result of
scientific fact ‘that is free for the taking,’ not ‘due to protected aesthetic
expressions.’”221 Without explicitly stating so, Judge Seibel defined the
plaintiff’s figure as a pictorial or graphic work describing the metabolic
pathway, and applied the criteria, such as color or shape, often used to
assess similarity between pictorial or graphic works.222 Imagine the
reaction of the plaintiff, a biochemist PhD, when she learned that her
diagram depicting the metabolic pathway that she altered to delay the
effects of fruit ripening was not “substantially similar” to the defendant’s
diagram depicting the same altered pathway because one diagram uses
thick black arrows while the other uses thin colorful arrows, or because
one diagram uses boxes while the other uses boxes and ovals.223
In the case of verbal representations of DNA compounds, there may be
minimal if any “protected aesthetic expression.”224 One can imagine a
similar reaction from a biochemist if told that a verbal representation of a
genetic DNA compound written as AATTTGGCGGGTTT copied from
another verbal representation of a genetic DNA compound written as
AattTggCgggTtt would not be infringing. The first sequence may be
copyrightable as a literary work just as the plaintiff’s figure was
219. No. 17-CV-5600, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93513 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018), aff’d, 765 F. App’x
470 (2d Cir. 2019).
220. Id. at *18–19.
221. Id. at *19 (quoting Horizon Comics Prods. v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 246 F. Supp. 3d 937, 941
(S.D.N.Y. 2017)). The plaintiff discovered that the modified metabolic pathway described in the
article can be induced by introducing a certain chemical to plant cells. Id. at *1–2. The diagrams
displayed the introduction of the chemicals and the following reactions that take place in the cells. Id.
Therefore, I would argue that the diagrams depicted an invention rather than a fact.
222. See id. at *18–19.
223. Id. at *19.
224. Id. at *17 (quoting Horizon Comics, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 941).
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copyrightable as a graphic work in Perry. However, the second sequence
may not constitute copyright infringement because, although the idea or
useful art created—the DNA compound—is lifted in whole from the
original work, that element is unprotected by copyright. The capitalization
may be protected expression just as the color of the arrows and the shapes
of the boxes were protected expression in Perry. Because the second
sequence did not copy the capitalization of the first, there is no
infringement.
This conclusion may seem absurd to scientists who have put their hearts
and souls into their scientific creations, but nothing in copyright law
compels the conclusion that copyright will necessarily protect the
commercially (or intellectually) valuable aspect of any work. Indeed,
excluding the commercially valuable functional aspects of an information
technology work from copyright protection should be much easier to
swallow than excluding the commercially valuable facts in a compilation
from copyright protection. Despite the exclusion of facts from the
copyright protection afforded compilations, both courts and
commentators, perhaps out of a sense of equity, are sometimes inclined to
extend copyright protection to the commercially valuable (and costly to
gather) information disclosed in those compilations.225 However,
information technology works, as opposed to informational works,
present no such quandary. Functional aspects of an information
technology work are often already protected by intellectual property law,
specifically patents, as well as trade secrets even if they are excluded from
copyright protection.
In many ways, copyright protection for a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs
defined as a literary work describing a DNA compound can be compared
to a photograph of some paint on a board. Both the DNA compound and
the paint on a board store a work which may be copyrightable or not. The
DNA compound may store a motion picture or a process of synthesizing
protein. Paint on a board may store a work of art or a road sign. The
sequence of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs is an accurate description of the DNA
compound with that sequence of nucleotides226 just as a photograph may
225. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1875–80 (1990). Acknowledging this inclination, Jane
Ginsburg proposed the explicit recognition of a two-tier copyright regime, with different scopes of
protection for high authorship works, such as novels and narrative histories, and low authorship
works, such as telephone directories and compilations of stock quotations, so called informational
works. Id. at 1869.
226. Back in 2001, Dan Burk argued that the series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs “which seems to display
the information” in DNA “is not by itself of interest” because much of the essential information of
value is omitted. See Burk, supra note 58, at 586. However, now, in the era of mail order DNA and
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be an accurate description of the paint on the board. As discussed in detail
by Justin Hughes, a photograph that is simply an accurate representation
of an uncopyrightable work (in my example, the road sign) “has no
copyright protection at all.”227 Graphic representations that are merely
“slavish copying” of automobiles228 and photographs of transmissions
parts229 and spindle bearings230 have been found to lack copyright
protection.231 Similarly, a verbal representation of a DNA compound that
is simply an accurate description of an uncopyrightable creation, such as
a genetic DNA compound, should have no copyright protection at all, or
at least, copying the aspects that comprise the DNA compound should not
be an infringement.232
Some scholars have taken a similar approach to assessing the
appropriate copyright protection for computer code. Under that reasoning,
computer code, a literary work which describes the compiled machinereadable fixation of a program, is a very accurate description of that
software. As John Kidwell described, “[i]f one conceives of a computer
as an extraordinarily complicated set of electrical switches and
relays, . . . [t]he entry of the program into the computer is nothing more
than the translation of the description of the switch settings into the setting
of the switches themselves.”233
DNA printers, it is difficult to see how any information unique to a particular DNA compound is left
out of the series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs that may be used to represent it.
227. Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 361–64, 374 (2012); see also Cindy Alberts Carson, Laser Bones:
Copyright Issues Raised by the Use of Information Technology in Archaeology, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 281 (1997) (concluding that medical and scientific imaging should similarly not be entitled to
copyright protection).
228. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008).
229. ATC Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712
(6th Cir. 2005).
230. J. Thomas Distribs. v. Greenline Distribs., 100 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 1996).
231. But see Tomelleri v. Zazzle, Inc., No. 13-CV-0257, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165007 (D. Kan.
Dec. 9, 2015) (finding question of fact whether a scientifically accurate depictions of fish lack
originality required for copyright).
232. At times, courts jump to the infringement analysis before first identifying the work which is
allegedly copied and making an assessment regarding its copyrightability. As noted by Michael Risch,
“[i]n all three instances in which [the Supreme Court] has rendered an opinion on whether copyright
protection extends to a portion of a work, it has reached its decision by comparing the accused work
with the copyright claimant’s work, and not by issuing a declaration of uncopyrightability.” Brief for
Michael Risch as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 593 U.S.
__, 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021) (No. 18-956) (argued before the Supreme Court on Oct. 7, 2020)
(discussing Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1878); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)). Jane Ginsburg also discussed how the
Second Circuit in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995), “confused the question
of copyright scope with its subsistence.” Ginsburg, supra note 225, at 1897 (emphasis in original).
233. Kidwell, supra note 128, at 542.
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The code may be copyrightable, but the program is not protected. As
Lloyd Weinreb recognized,
[t]he representation of a program [or sequence of nucleotides in a
genetic DNA compound] in code or some other symbolic
form . . . may be copyrightable, to the extent that its concrete
expression is original. The program [or sequence of nucleotides
in a genetic DNA compound] that is represented, however,
contains no expression and is not copyrightable . . . .234
C.

The Scope of Copyright for Verbal Representations as an
Alternative Form in Which DNA Compounds Exist

Under the second metaphysical conception, the series of As, Ts, Cs,
and Gs is not a description of the DNA compound, but rather, it stores the
same information as the DNA compound itself. As recognized in the
patent literature, “[a]lthough [verbal representations of] DNA sequences
represent chemical compounds, they are more fundamentally carriers of
information.”235 Rather than describing a DNA compound, a sequence of
As, Ts, Cs, and Gs may be, in a sense, an alternative form in which the
DNA compound exists. The sequence is an embodiment in another
medium of the DNA compound with that sequence of nucleotides.236 Most
discussions about the copyrightability of computer programs have treated
computer code in this manner. As Samuelson, Davis, Reichman, and
Kapor stated, “source code is the medium in which a program is
created.”237
This formulation is probably compelling to scholars and judges in the
context of computer programs because computer code can now be
converted into the program stored as the two electrical states on a tape or
other digital storage device through procedures that function in a black

234. Weinreb, supra note 114, at 1168. I would alter Professor Weinreb’s statement slightly to add,
that the program contains no valuable expression. A machine code program written 000111010101
has the same amount of nonfunctional expression as a DNA sequence AATTTGCG. A machine code
program written 000111 01010101 may not infringe just as a DNA sequence AA TTT GCG may not
infringe.
235. Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2
WASH. U. J.L & POL’Y 199, 204 (2000).
236. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
237. Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2323 (1994); see
also id. at 2316 (“The view of programs as texts has been widely adopted in the legal community.”).
In other words, computer code is considered to be the computer program contained in software, which
stores information consisting of steps of a process performed by a computer. To apply Professor
Weinreb’s comparison of computer programs to gears in a car, the program code becomes the gears
rather than the description of the gears.
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box and without intervention on the part of a person.238 As recognized by
Kidwell, when a program is loaded into a computer, the description (or in
other words, the program code) of the electrical switch settings “at a
certain point become the switch settings [or in other words, the program
contained in software].”239 In effect, to someone who cannot see in the
box, the program code appears to be an alternative medium in which to
store the information stored in the program. Similarly, a verbal
representation of a DNA compound can be converted into the DNA
compound itself through procedures that function in a black box and
without intervention on the part of a person. The verbal representation of
a DNA compound appears to be an alternative medium in which to store
the information stored in the DNA compound.
If the information stored in a DNA compound is a copyrightable work,
such as a novel or motion picture, this alternative conception of the verbal
representation leads to a satisfying result. Copyright may prohibit copying
the series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs verbally representing the compound.
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act states that copyright subsists in works
of authorship “fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”240 A novel or motion picture fixed in a DNA compound is
perceived with the aid of two machines. First a sequencing machine
identifies the sequence of nucleotides in the DNA compound. At least
with current technology, the sequence of nucleotides is then converted to
digital storage with the aid of a computer and then converted by the
computer to the novel or motion picture perceivable by humans. Inputting
a series of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs representing the sequence of nucleotides
into a computer simply circumvents the first step of sequencing the DNA
compound. Therefore, a novel or motion picture fixed in a series of As,
Ts, Cs, and Gs is simply a shortcut that allows the novel or motion picture
to be perceived with the aid of one fewer machine.241
But conceiving of verbal representations of DNA compounds as
alternative embodiments of the compounds themselves leads to some
absurd results when applied to genetic DNA. Under this formulation, if
the DNA compound is a genetic DNA compound that stores the process
for protein synthesis, the verbal representation of that genetic DNA
238. In the era of computer programming using punch cards, this was not the case.
239. Kidwell, supra note 128, at 542.
240. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
241. Given the capacity of motion pictures to be stored as literary works, it is unclear into which
category of copyrightable work such a work would fall. This question exists with respect to digitally
stored motion pictures as well.
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compound also stores the process for protein synthesis.242 Treating a
verbal representation of a DNA compound as storing the information
contained in the chemical compound allows literary works to do
something they have not previously done. While traditional literary works
may describe functional creations such as machines or processes, literary
works in these information technologies can be functional creations.243
Just as a genetic DNA compound can be functional, so can the verbal
representation.244 To extend the visual analogy of a lithograph picturing a
paint can, if the lithograph is a visual embodiment of the paint can in the
same way as the series of letters is a verbal embodiment of the DNA
compound, it would seem as if the lithograph itself can now function to
contain the paint. Despite this absurdity, if information technology has
enabled literary works to be both functional and expressive in the same
way that pictorial, graphic and sculptural works can be, literary works
should similarly be “protected in form but not their . . . utilitarian
aspects.”245 In contrast to literary works which describe something
utilitarian, a literary work storing only information that is a process may
be useful in and of itself and should therefore be excluded from copyright
protection as a utilitarian creation.
D.

(Mis)applying the Merger Doctrine

The merger doctrine as applied to traditional literary works mandates
that if the expression present in the copyrighted work is one of a limited
number of ways to express an idea, the expression “merges” with the idea
and should not be protected by copyright.246 If a series of As, Ts, Cs, and
Gs is treated as a traditional literary text, in other words, one that describes
the underlying chemical compound, the expression is the series of letters,
and the idea is the DNA compound. Under the merger doctrine, if there
are only limited ways a functional genetic DNA compound can be
described, the expression in the literary work may merge with the

242. See infra section III.C.
243. See Samuelson et al., supra note 237, at 2323 (“Program text is, thus, like steel and plastic, a
medium in which other works can be created. A device built in the medium of steel or plastic, if
sufficiently novel, is patentable; an original sculpture built of steel or plastic is copyrightable.”).
244. See, e.g., McBride, supra note 200, at 1337 (discussing how scientists use databases of
nucleotide sequences to compare and assign biological functions to particular or characteristic
sequences).
245. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (internal citations omitted).
246. Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 417, 417, 419–20 (2016); see also Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 293 n.11
(3d Cir. 2004) (Roth, J., dissenting) (“The merger doctrine is a variation or application of the
idea/expression dichotomy.”).
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uncopyrightable idea and be excluded from copyright protection. In other
words, the result is the same under the doctrine of merger as it is when the
verbal representation of the genetic DNA compound is considered merely
an accurate depiction of an uncopyrightable work.
But as discussed in section IV.C., infra, in the context of the written
representations of computer software or DNA compounds, the literary
work is often not treated as describing the underlying idea of the computer
program or the DNA compound’s nucleotide sequence. It is treated as
containing the same information as the software or compound. It becomes
an alternative form in which the software or compound exists. Thus, the
function of the computer program or series of nucleotides in the DNA
compound becomes the function of the literary work. Much to the
detriment of clarity in copyright law, when literary works thus entered the
realm of functional creations, they brought along with them the doctrine
of merger.247
In the context of computer software, because courts have treated
computer code as an alternative embodiment rather than a description of
the underlying computer program, they have considered the function of
the computer program, rather than the program itself, to be the “idea” with
which an expression in computer code may merge. Under this formulation
of the merger doctrine as applied to information technology, a functional
literary work which consists of the only way of performing a function
“merges” with the “idea” of the function and is excluded from copyright
protection.248
The perversity of the merger doctrine to determine the proper extent of
copyright protection for functional aspects of a work is disclosed when
the inverse is asserted. Pamela Samuelson traces the source of the merger
doctrine to the early computer software copyright decision Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.249 In that decision, while
recognizing that “[m]any of the courts which have sought to draw the line
between an idea and expression have found difficulty in articulating where

247. Professor Samuelson traces the source of the application of the merger doctrine in computer
software cases to the case Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983). Samuelson, supra note 246, at 419–20. In her view, the extension of the merger doctrine to
software copyright cases stems from a misinterpretation of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), as
restating the distinction between abstract ideas and expression rather than establishing the exclusion
of procedures, processes, systems and methods of operations from copyright protection. Samuelson,
supra note 217, at 1974; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-388, at 23 (1993).
248. If computer code was more sensibly treated as describing the computer program, the
underlying idea would be the computer program rather than the function of the computer program.
Computer code without comments or other nonfunctional elements would in most cases merge with
the idea of the computer program.
249. 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983); see Samuelson, supra note 246, at 419–20.
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it falls,” the court concluded that the pragmatic and proper line of inquiry
should be “whether the idea is capable of various modes of expression.”250
The court concluded that “[i]f other programs can . . . perform the same
function as [a particular program], then that program is an expression of
the idea and hence copyrightable.”251 Thus, a justification for the
copyrightability of functional aspects of literary works was born.252
The inverse of the merger doctrine has also been discussed as a
justification for copyright protection for the functional aspects of “DNA
sequences.” In his discussion of the copyrightability of “DNA sequences,”
Torrance recognizes that the functionality of DNA compounds,
particularly genetic DNA compounds, may limit copyrightability of such
compounds.253 However, he goes on to apply the inverse of the merger
doctrine. Just as the court in Apple v. Franklin labelled the function of the
computer program represented in computer code to be the computer
code’s idea, he treats the function of the underlying DNA compound’s
nucleotide sequence represented in the literary work as the “idea” with
which an expression may merge. Applying the same reasoning as the court
in Apple v. Franklin, he concludes that “if multiple DNA sequences could
produce the same [protein] with a particular function, then any one
individual [DNA] sequence would likely have much stronger copyright
protection.”254 He continues, “[a]s DNA sequences increase in length and
complexity, . . . their eligibility for copyright protection would grow in
250. Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1253.
251. Id. (basing this test on a statement by the Second Circuit that a plurality of copyrights may
exist for a plurality of ways of expressing an idea). See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir.
1926).
252. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that the accepted test
for distinguishing the “idea” from the “expression” in the computer area was formulated in Apple v.
Franklin); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing
that “evidence that numerous methods exist for writing the programs involved” proved that, as in
Apple v. Franklin, “Apple seeks to copyright only its particular set of instructions, not the underlying
computer process”); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
Apple v. Franklin with approval and finding that “an original work—even one that serves a function—
is entitled to copyright protection as long as the author had multiple ways to express the underlying
idea”); see also Autoskill, Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., 793 F. Supp. 1557, 1564–67 (1992)
(stating that the court in Apple v. Franklin rejected an interpretation of Baker v. Selden which would
exclude functional works from copyright protection), aff’d, 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1993). To
distinguish protectable expression from unprotectable idea in the context of computer programs,
“courts have looked for evidence of other programs in the marketplace which perform the same
functions as the copyrighted work without employing the same methodology.” Id. at 1567. For a
discussion of the dispute between Lotus Development Corp. and Paperback Software International,
see Weinreb, supra note 114, at 1154–63.
253. Torrance, supra note 8, at 3 (“[E]ven DNA sequences that code for functional polypeptides or
RNAs may qualify for copyright protection to the extent that function does not dictate structure, and
expression is not unduly constrained.”).
254. Id. at 34.
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proportion to their potential to be expressed in multiple ways.”255
Applying the merger doctrine to other mixed functional and
nonfunctional works demonstrates the folly of this novel application to
allow copyright protection for functional aspects of literary works in
information technologies such as DNA and computer software. Outside
of the context of computer programs, the merger doctrine does not operate
to permit copyright protection for the functional aspects of a work when
there is more than one way to achieve that function.256 Imagine if it did.
The accounting form in Baker v. Selden257 would be copyrightable
because there was more than one form which could be used to perform
the accounting system and therefore the “expression” in the form does not
merge with the function.258 The bicycle rack in Brandir International, Inc.
v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.259 would not be functional because there
is more than one way to provide a parking space for a bike.260 Indeed, a
mousetrap would be copyrightable because there are multiple ways to
build a better mousetrap that all perform the same function.261
A showing that there is only one way to express something and still
255. Id. at 36. As with all other functional works, the number of ways that a function may be
“expressed” depends entirely on how the function is defined. There are many more DNA compounds
that store the information necessary to synthesize a hormone, any hormone, than there are DNA
compounds that store the information necessary to synthesize human growth hormone, specifically.
But no matter whether the process is defined broadly or narrowly, it is a process. Thus, whether you
define the process as synthesizing a hormone or synthesizing human growth hormone, the information
stored in the DNA compound is a process.
256. Arguments supporting the merger doctrine often state the inquiry as determining whether there
is more than one way to “express” that function. Query what it means to express a function. I suspect
that the term “express” is used to make the application of the merger doctrine in functional works
sound more similar to the traditional application of the merger doctrine in the idea/expression context.
An expression may describe a process or method of operation, but an expression probably is not a
process or method of operation.
257. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Although Baker v. Selden has been cited as establishing the
idea/expression dichotomy, more convincing analyses conclude that it “contributed the system and
other useful art exclusions to § 102(b).” See Samuelson, supra note 217, at 1928–36; Weinreb, supra
note 114, at 1176.
258. Indeed, Baker’s form was not identical to Selden’s form. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
259. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
260. Id.
261. At least 4,400 patents have been issued for mousetraps. Nicholas Jackson, Mousetraps: A
Symbol of the American Entrepreneurial Spirit, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/03/mousetraps-a-symbol-of-the-americanentrepreneurial-spirit/70573/ [https://perma.cc/QXV7-BFBG]. The mousetrap example does beg the
general copyrightability question in the extreme case of a Rube Goldberg mousetrap. See Rube
Goldberg, How to Get Rid of a Mouse, RUBE GOLDBERG, https://www.rubegoldberg.com/
artwork/how-to-get-rid-of-a-mouse-2/ [https://perma.cc/HK6M-FW3X]. However, in that case, the
proper inquiry would be whether an aspect of the mousetrap was not part of the function of a
mousetrap and therefore possibly copyrightable. The question is not whether there are multiple ways
to “express” a mousetrap.
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achieve the author’s functional goal may constitute evidence that the
expression is functional, but the inverse is not necessarily true. Evidence
that there are many versions of an expression, whether it is a mousetrap,
program code, or the verbal representation of a DNA compound, that may
achieve the same functional goal does not preclude the expression from
being functional.
While the idea/expression dichotomy, including the merger corollary,
can operate effectively to establish the proper bounds of copyright
protection for literary works which describe functional creations, only an
outright exclusion for systems and other useful arts can establish the
proper bounds for literary works which can be functional creations. As
Samuelson points out, software case law has highlighted the deficiencies
of applying the idea/expression dichotomy to exclude copyright
protection for functional aspects of literary works.262 If verbal
representations of DNA compounds can now be functional, the inverse of
the merger doctrine should not be used to establish copyright protection
for their functional aspects. Rather, functional aspects of verbal
representations of DNA compounds, just as functional aspects of other
works, should be excluded from copyright protection.
CONCLUSION
Resolving ownership rights for the information stored in DNA matters.
As our society and economy become less dependent on physical materials,
information is becoming the currency of our interactions. Researchers no
longer need to transfer chemical material, such as DNA compounds,
among themselves. Information, in the form of the sequence of
nucleotides in a DNA compound, is sent between labs, “there to be resynthesized and expressed as needed.”263 One can imagine a similar future
with respect to physical objects such as the Stanford Bunny.264 As the
means of physical production become more widely accessible, rather than
receiving a product through the mail, 3-D printing instructions will be sent
over the internet or stored in the material used to print the object itself.
Ownership of the information necessary to produce an object is becoming
equivalent to ownership of the object itself.
If the law regarding copyright protection for functional literary works
262. Samuelson, supra note 217, at 1974.
263. Robert Carlson, Open-Source Biology and Its Impact on Industry, IEEE SPECTRUM, May
2001, at 15, 17, http://www.eng.ucy.ac.cy/cpitris/courses/ECE001/notes/IEEEarticles/Opensource%20Biology%20And%20Its%20Impact%20On%20Industry%20-%20May%202001.pdf (last
visited Apr. 13, 2022).
264. Researchers have stored 3D printing instructions for a bunny figurine in DNA embedded in
the figurine, itself. See Koch et al., supra note 53, at 40.
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follows the current path for copyright protection in computer code,
copyright protection for verbal representations of DNA compounds may
include protection for the functional aspects of DNA itself. Failure to
distinguish between computer code, computer programs and their
functions along with a failure to recognize the difference between literary
works that describe a functional entity and literary works which are
themselves functional has led to copyright protection for functional
aspects of computer software. A similar lack of clarity about the
distinctions between DNA compounds, verbal representations of DNA
compounds, and the functions of DNA compounds threatens to lead to the
same result. Now is the time to set copyright protection for DNA on a
different path—before there are the statements of a CONTU-like
commission with which to contend, before there exists inconvenient
statutory language to address, and before there are conflicting court cases
to reconcile.
Attempts to establish the appropriate scope of copyright protection for
DNA by categorizing “DNA sequences” as works within or outside of the
categories of works Congress intended to include in the Copyright Act
miss the fundamental point. Recent advances enabling DNA compounds
to store anything from sonnets to motion pictures make clear what has
been true all along. DNA compounds are not works at all. DNA is a
medium in which works are fixed. Just as with any other mechanical,
electrical, magnetic, or chemical tangible medium of expression “now
known or later developed,”265 whether copyright prohibits the production
of an unauthorized copy depends entirely on the nature of the information
fixed in the copy. A novel or a work of art stored in a DNA compound
should be entitled to copyright protection to the same extent as a novel or
work of art stored in any other medium. DNA compounds that participate
in the cellular processes to construct proteins should be excluded from
copyright protection as part of a procedure, process, system, or method of
operation.
Verbal representations of DNA compounds are copyrightable to the
same extent as any other literary work and with the same exclusions
applicable to any other literary work. As with any other literary work,
copyright protection for the literary work should not extend to a functional
DNA compound described in the literary work. Even if considered an
alternate embodiment of the DNA compound itself, verbal representations
of DNA compounds, as functional works, should only be protected by
copyright to the extent they are not functional. Finally, the doctrine of
merger should not be misapplied to functional works such as verbal
265. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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representations of genetic DNA compounds to allow copyright protection
for procedures, systems, processes, or methods of operation even if there
are alternative ways to achieve the same function.
As patent rights in DNA compounds are limited by court decisions,
there will inevitably be more discussion of copyright protection for DNA
as inventors are motivated to turn to copyright to gain monopoly rights for
DNA-based technology.266 Extension of the copyright term to seventy or
more years267 further incentivizes those seeking exclusive rights to
biological compounds to turn to copyright rather than patents to obtain
those rights. Copyright protection for functional DNA could, at the
discretion of the copyright holder, be used to create a commons of useful
tools, but it seems foolish to rely on the goodwill of copyright owners to
guarantee that what should not be protected by copyright remains free for
the public to use. As Drew Endy, a scientist working in the new field of
bioengineering has noted, copyright protection for functional DNA would
be “horrifying” and “really dangerous if you mess it up” because
copyright’s lengthy term means that such exclusive rights “never end.”268

266. See, e.g., Malshe, supra note 8, at 37 (predicting that the resulting action from the Supreme
Court’s Myriad decision “is now going to be a scramble to get man-made DNA copyright
protection”); Torrance & Kahl, supra note 47, at 227 (“Now that natural-source DNA molecules have
lost their eligibility for patent protection, copyright stands ready to provide an existing alternative
form of protection.”).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
268. Holman, supra note 60, at 459 (quoting Stanford Law School, IP Law and Biosciences
Conference | Keynote Speaker Drew Endy, YOUTUBE, at 50:30–52:00 (May 21, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qku3OQ5O_U4 [https://perma.cc/3V53-B8NB]).
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